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ABSTRACT
I.G. FARBEN’S PETRO-CHEMICAL PLANT 
AND CONCENTRATION CAMP AT AUSCHWITZ
Robert Simon Yavner
Old Dominion University, 1984 
Director: Dr. Darwin Bostick
This study examines the history of the petro­
chemical plant and concentration camp run by I.G. Farben- 
industrie (the dominant German chemical company during 
World War II) at Auschwitz to decide upon the degree of 
Farben’s involvement with Hitler and the Holocaust. The 
study traces the construction of the plant to determine 
Farben's participation at Auschwitz. The main sources 
consulted were the transcripts of the postwar Farben trial 
at Nuremberg along with eyewitness accounts of members of 
the prosecution staff. Based on the court's verdict, one 
might conclude that I.G. Farben operated in a state of 
coercion during the war and could not be held accountable 
for most of its actions. The history of the Auschwitz 
plant indicates, however, that I.G. Farben had some 
involvement in the extermination process.
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PREFACE
On December 9, 1925, eight of the largest chemical 
companies in Germany merged to form the I.G. Farbenindustrie 
Aktiengesellschaft (better known as I.G. Farben).^ This 
merger led to the creation of one of the largest industrial 
corporations in the world. I.G. Farben monopolized the 
chemical industry in Germany. Prior to World War I, those 
companies controlled 85 percent of the world's chemical 
production. Two of the new company's prominent leaders, 
Carl Duisberg and Carl Bosch, were ardent Pan-Germans who 
believed passionately in Germany's mission in world 
affairs.
During the two world wars, the German chemical 
industry played a prominent role in supplying important war 
materials. In World War I, its factories produced gun­
powder and poison gases. Major Victor Lefebure, a British 
chemical liaison officer, stated that Germany would have 
been compelled to abandon the struggle after the summer of
^Farben: to dye or stain; Aktiengesellschaft
(A.G.): joint stock corporation.
2Joseph Borkin and Charles A. Welsh, Germany * s 
Master Plan (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1943),
p. 97.
1
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31915 without the help of the chemical industry. Between 
the wars both Hitler and the leaders of I.G. Farben con­
cluded that the British blockade was an important reason 
Germany was forced to surrender. Both parties decided that 
Germany needed to become an autarky to win another war. In 
the mid-1930s Farben contracted to manufacture oil, rubber, 
gunpowder, and other chemical products for the Wehrmacht. 
The expansion of synthetic rubber production led to the 
construction of a plant (known as I.G. Auschwitz) outside 
the Auschwitz concentration camp. Farben became the first 
company to sign a contract with the SS for the use of 
inmate labor on a large scale. Thousands of inmates died 
while working at this plant. After World War II Farben's 
managing board of directors was brought to trial at 
Nuremberg. I.G. Farben became the first industrial concern 
to be charged with war crimes. The prosecution charged the 
Farben directors with the planning and waging of aggressive 
war, the plundering of the European chemical industry, and 
participating in slave labor and mass murder. The slave 
labor and mass murder charge included participation in the 
forced labor program, the production of the Zyclon-B gas 
used in the gas chambers, the use of experimental drugs on 
concentration camp inmates, and maltreatment of workers 
which resulted in thousands of deaths at I.G. Auschwitz.
The bulk of the prosecution's evidence dealt with the
^Victor Lefebure, The Riddle of the Rhine (New 
York: The Chemical Foundation, Inc., 1923), p. 205.
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3
aggressive war charges. It seems inconceivable that the 
prosecution did not put more emphasis on Farben's role at 
Auschwitz.
Four books have been written in English directly
about I.G. Farben: The Riddle of the Rhine (1923) by
Victor Lefebure, I.G. Farben (1947) by Richard Sasuly,
The Devil's Chemists (1952) by Josiah Dubois, and The Crime
and Punishment of I.G. Farben (1978) by Joseph Borkin^
Borkin also co-authored a book entitled Germany's Master
Plan (1943). The book is not entirely about I.G. Farben,
but the company is dealt with in great detail. One school
of thought is consistent throughout these books: the
record of I.G. Farben was a recital of Germany's attempts
4to use scientific methods to control the world.
Not one of the authors shows a lack of restraint 
when writing about I.G. Farben. L. M. Hacker, when he 
reviewed Germany's Master Plan, compared the book to an 
Alfred Hitchcock movie.^ Lefebure described the German 
chemical companies as a ''trump card for the future" because 
they had the power to use their laboratories either as a 
sword for war or a plough for peace.^ Dubois, as a member
^Borkin and Welsh, Germany's Master Plan, p. 19.
^L. M. Hacker, review of Germany's Master Plan, by 
Joseph Borkin and Charles A. Welsh, in New York Herald 
Tribune, 7 February 1943, Book section, p. 3.
^Lefebure, Riddle of the Rhine, p. 206.
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of the Farben trial team at Nuremburg, tried to prove that 
I.G. Farben was guilty of making Mein Kampf a reality.^
The theme of Sasuly's book was that Germany was still a 
war-maker and that I.G. Farben was one of the forces that 
kept her active.^
It is important to note that the judgment of the 
Farben trial does not reflect the view of those authors. 
Most found it hard to visualize industrialists as men of 
war because they did not pull any triggers. The heaviest 
sentences handed out were to those men who were involved 
with I.G. Auschwitz, but none of the sentences exceeded 
eight years, an extremely soft penalty for anyone involved 
in the greatest murder machine in history.
This paper' traces the history of I.G. Auschwitz. 
Its components are Farben’s decisio: to build a plant at 
Auschwitz, the nature of Farben's activities at Auschwitz, 
the U.S. prosecutors' decision to emphasize the aggressive 
war charges rather than crimes against humanity, and the 
tribunal's verdict.
"United States of America v. Carl Krauch et al.," 
14 August 1947 - 30 July 1948, Records of the United States 
Nuernberg War Crimes Trials. Record Group 238, National 
Archives, Washington, D.C., Microfilm Publication M-892, 
roll 2, frame 59.
ORichard Sasuly, I.G. Farben (New York: Boni and
Gaer, Inc., 1947), p. 231.
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CHAPTER I
I.G. FARBEN BEFORE HITLER
By 1900 six German companies rose to prominence in
the field of chemical production and distribution: Badishe
Anilin und Soda-Fabrik of Ludwigshafen (BASF), Farbwerke
vorm. Meister Lucius & Bruening of Hoechst (Hoechst),
Farbenfabriken vorm. Fredrich Bayer & Co. of Leverkusen
(Bayer), Aktiengesellschaft fuer Anilinfabrikation of
Berlin (Agfa), Leopold Cassella & Co. of Frankfurt
(Cassella), and Kalle & Co. A.G. of Biebrich (Kalle).*
Their success led to bitter and costly competition for a
larger share of the foreign and domestic markets. This
created price cutting, protracted patent litigation,
kickbacks to customers, and bribery to gain technical
2secrets, all of which reduced profits and growth.
In 1903 Carl Duisberg, the head of Bayer, tried to 
persuade the other companies to combine and form a trust 
in order to end the costly competition. As a scientist
Hermann Gross, Further Facts and Figures Relating 
to the Deconcentration of the I.G. Farbenindustrie 
Aktiengesellschaft (Kiel: n.p., 1950), p. 8.
2Joseph Borkin, The Crime and Punishment of I.G.
Farben (New York: The Free Press, 1978), p. 5.
5
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he was aware that research could be advanced so much better
if all facilities were pooled. As an administrator he saw
that duplication of effort wasted money, especially on the
3purchasing side of materials. The six companies were
receptive, but they had reservations about surrendering too
much control over their own corporate affairs. The result
was that two loose-knit joint organizations, each known as
an Interessengemeinschaft (meaning community of interests)
developed. One was made up of Bayer, BASF, and Agfa; the
other of Hoechst, Cassella, and Kalle. That helped to
reduce the competition between the parties by setting up a
formula for sharing profits, while each company retained
4its identity and control over policies and activities.
Since Germany had no antitrust laws, cartelization 
was a common practice among the German industries. German 
courts had condoned this practice. In 1888 the courts had 
ruled that if individual companies could not restore the 
proper balance between supply and demand, it was best for 
them to combine and agree on limitations.^ Prior to World
Louis P. Lochner, Tycoons and Tyrants: German
Industry from Hitler to Adenauer (Chicago: Henry Regnery
Co., 1954), pp. 40-41.
^"United States of America v. Carl Krauch et al.,11
14 August 1947 - 30 July 1948, Records of the United States 
Nuernberg War Crimes Trials, Record Group 238, National 
Archives, Washington, D.C., Microfilm Publication M-892, 
roll 2, frame 63 (hereafter cited as U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/ 
2/63).
^Richard Sasuly, I.G. Farben (New York: Boni and
Gaer, Inc., 1947), p. 241.
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War I, the German chemical industry had attained an almost 
absolute monopoly in the organic dyestuffs, pharmaceutical, 
and synthetic chemical industries of the world. The 
leaders of this industry represented the height of pan- 
Germanism in the economic sphere. . This chemical industry 
was at all times the servant of the German government.
In 1909 Fritz Haber developed a synthetic nitrate 
that could be used to make fertilizers or gunpowder. By 
1913 Carl Bosch, the head of BASF, had taken Haber's 
discovery out of the laboratory and started mass production 
of synthetic nitrates to make fertilizers. This process 
came to be known as the "Haber-Bosch process.” Prior to 
this, most of the world was dependent on Chile's supply of 
natural nitrates in the form of saltpeter.^
After Germany did not achieve the quick victory it 
had hoped for in World War I, Walther von Rathenau realized 
that Germany's supply of gunpowder was insufficient. He 
persuaded the War Ministry to call upon Bosch to mass 
produce gunpowder for the war effort. Bosch said he would 
do so but only with substantial government subsidy. By May 
1915 Bosch was supplying the Wehrmacht with sufficient 
amounts of gunpowder to carry on the war. Bosch's success 
helped to free Germany from dependence on Chile and proved
See U.S. v. Krauch. M-892/2/66; Morris Goran, The 
Story of Fritz Haber (Norman, Okla.: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1967), p. 42.
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to be a financial bonanza for BASF. With the help of 
Hermann Schmitz, a young lieutenant in the War Raw 
Materials Office, Bosch persuaded the government to build 
a huge Haber-Bosch high-pressure plant in Leuna, in central 
Germany.
Also during the war, the chemical companies 
developed poison gases for use in warfare. German chemists 
developed chlorine, perite, and mustard gases, which the 
chemical factories produced. The chemical industry worked 
closely with Haber when he prepared the chlorine gas used 
at the Battle of Ypres in April 1915. After the war,
Victor Lefebure wrote that the chemical industry functioned,
in a sense, as the supply line of German offensive war-
- 7fare.
After the Battle of the Somme in July 1916, the 
members of the chemical industry realized that a German 
victory was no longer certain. They realized that the 
world's chemical industry had grown during the war and that 
they needed to strengthen their position for the postwar
g
struggle against new competitors. In mid-August 1916 
eight companies formed one large Interessengemeinschaft: 
BASF, Bayer, Hoescht, Kalle, Cassella, Agfa, Griesheim
^Victor Lefebure, The Riddle of the Rhine (New 
York: The Chemical Foundation, Inc., 1923), p. 206.
g
Robert A. Brady, The Rationalization Movement in 
German Industry (New York: Howard Fertig, 1974), p. 59.
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(Chemisch Fabrik Griesheim-Elektron of Frankfurt), and Ter 
Meer (Chemische Fabriken vorm. Weiler-ter Meer of 
Uerdingen). This chemical cartel came to be known as 
Interessen Gemeinschaft der Deutschen Teerfarbenindustrie 
(the community of interest of the German dyestuff industry). 
In subsequent years the cartel came to be known simply as 
the I.G., and the individual members as I.G. companies.
Each company still retained its identity.
In 1923 the French invaded the Ruhr because the 
German government was delinquent in reparation payments.
The closure of most I.G. plants during the French occupa­
tion had increased the strength of foreign competitors.
By the fall of 1923 Duisberg and Bosch were convinced that 
a reorganization of the I.G. was needed to form a broader 
and more substantial corporate base. Bosch proposed that 
all of the I.G. companies merge into a single corporation.
By 1924 a firm agreement was reached. On December 9, 1925, 
the eight companies merged, and the new company took the 
name of I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft (I.G. 
Farben). Carl Duisberg was elected head of the 
Aufsichtsrat (supervisory board of directors) and Carl
Bosch was elected head of the Vorstand (managing board of
 ̂ 10 directors).
9U.S. v. Krauch. M-892/2/64.
^Borkin, Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben. 
pp. 42-43.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 0
Under German corporate law the stockholders of a
conventional company elected an Aufsichtsrat and a
Vorstand. These elected offices were the focal points of
p o w e r . W h e n  I.G. Farben was created, the Aufsichtsrat
members and most of the Vorstand members of all the parent
companies became members of the Aufsichtsrat and Vorstand
of Farben. The functions of the Aufsichtsrat were not well
defined, and membership was mostly honorary. It met only
three or four times a year and generally followed the views
of the Vorstand. The Vorstand met once a month to formu-





The chairmen of the Vorstand were:
Carl Bosch 1926-1935
Hermann Schmitz 1935-1945
The I.G. Farben directorates, however, were mere
showpieces; membership in those bodies without a position
in an operating committee, a plant combination, or the
13central administration meant nothing. The head of the
U.S. v. Krauch. M-892/2/69-70. In general, the 
duty of the Aufsichtsrat was to supervise the overall 
management of the company. The Vorstand was to run the 
day-to-day operations.
12Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European 
Jews (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961), p. 590.
13Ibid., p. 592.
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Vorstand. nominally the head of the company, appeared to be
no more than a figurehead. That is why historian Raul
Hilberg described Farben as a "bureaucratic empire" and a
"headless colossus," running like an autonomous machine
that someone had set in m o t i o n . T e l f o r d  Taylor, in his
book Sword and Swastika, stated:
Largely because Farben was a widely owned stock 
corporation rather than a family enterprise like 
the Krupp concern, it presented an 'impersonal’ 
appearance to the public, and no individual 
Farben director achieved the world-wide notoriety
of the K r u p p s . 1 5
*
The company's power structure was divided into 
three components: the top echelon or policy-making struc­
ture of the organization, the central services, and the 
plants.*^ The policy-making structure had three separate 
centers of direction. The Technical Committee (TEA), 
headed by Dr. Fritz ter Meer, concerned itself with scien­
tific questions, raw materials, production methods, plant 
expansion, and related matters. The Sales Committee (KA), 
headed by Dr. Georg von Schnitzler, dealt with marketing, 
sales, and taxes. The Krauch office, headed by Dr. Carl 
Krauch, dealt with the expansion of the entire chemical 
industry. This latter office was established in September
14Ibid., pp. 590, 592.
■^Telford Taylor, Sword and Swastika (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1952), p. 98.
16U.S. v. Krauch. M-892/2/69-74.
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1935 to act as a military liaison office in Berlin. The 
central service department was headed by Dr. Max Ilgner 
(the nephew of Hermann Schmitz). It took care of matters 
dealing with personnel, protocol, legal problems, press, 
export, and political economy. The plants were divided 
into three divisions called Sparten. Sparte I (headed first 
by Carl Krauch, then by Dr. Christian Schneider) produced 
synthetic nitrates, synthetic gasoline, methanol, and 
other synthetic fuels. Sparte II (headed by Fritz ter 
Meer) produced dyestuffs, organic chemicals, pharmaceuti­
cals, light metals, synthetic rubber (buna), and a variety 
of other products. Sparte III (headed by Dr. Fritz 
Gajewski) produced photographic materials, synthetic 
fibres, and cellophane. The I.G. laboratories developed 
many well-known important products: aspirin, salvarsan (a
cure for syphilis), atebrin (a cure for malaria), novocain, 
heroin (originally developed as a cure for morphine addic­
tion), methadone (a synthetic substitute for morphine),
* 17 prestone, etc.
In the inter-war period I.G. Farben focused most of 
its attention onr the development of synthetic gasoline. In 
1909 Friedrich Bergius developed synthetic gasoline by com­
bining coal and hydrogen, under high pressure, in a process
See Gross, Further Facts and Figures, p. 11; 
Borkin, Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben. pp. 6-7; 
Josiah Dubois, The Devil’s Chemists (Boston: The Beacon
Press, 1952), p. 86.
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known as hydrogenation. In 1916 he tried to adapt his
hydrogenation process to large-scale production. By the
end of World War I, he was still unsuccessful in producing
this fuel which was so badly needed by the Wehrmacht. In
1925 Carl Bosch bought the patent rights to the Bergius
process. By 1926 I.G. Farben had the technical ability to
produce synthetic gasoline on a large scale, but the largest
obstacle to the project was the staggering cost. It took
the combined resources of the merged I.G. companies to
support such a project. Experiments also took place with
synthetic rubber which required the hydrogenation process.
In essence, Farben staked its future on the production of
these expensive products.
Joseph Borkin wrote that Bosch dreamed of liberating
Germany from dependence on foreign oil wells. This was the
lesson taught to many Germans by the British blockade in 
19World War I. Long before Hitler achieved notoriety, I.G.
Farben worked toward German self-sufficiency by developing
20synthetic oil and synthetic rubber., Richard Sasuly com­
pared the leaders of I.G. Farben to men like General Erich 
Ludendorff, who looked at the armistice which ended World
18U.S. v . Krauch, M-892/2/79-80.
■^Joseph Borkin and Charles A. Welsh, Germany *s 
Master Plan (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1943),
p . 43.
90 Taylor, Sword and Swastika, p. 96.
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2 1War I as no more than a suspension of hostilities. He
wrote that the military and industrial leaders of Germany
came out of one war entirely prepared to start thinking
about another. They knew they had made a good showing on
22the first try. They worked to correct their mistake.
Despite the cost, Bosch equipped the Leuna plant to
produce synthetic fuels. By July 1930 I.G. Farben had
poured Rm 300 million (approximately $120 million) into the
project with few results. The strain of the depression
prompted many of the directors to call for a halt to the
project. But Bosch, who was the dominant figure in Farben,
proved too powerful to be forced to close down the project.
He did realize, however, that he needed some kind of sub-
23sidy to save this expensive project.
During the depression Adolf Hitler's power grew 
tremendously. In the Reichstag election of July 1932, the 
Nazis became Germany's largest party capturing 230 of the 
608 seats. The Farben executives took note of this growth 
and decided to establish lines of communication with him. 
They wanted to know his feelings about the synthetic oil 
project in case he did become the German Chancellor. Not
21Mitchell Franklin, "Sources of International Law 
Relating to Sanctions Against War Criminals," Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology 36 (1945): 153.
^Sasuly, I.G. Farben. p. 39.
23 Borkin, Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben,
pp. 53-54,
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yet willing to have top I.G. Farben executives seen associ­
ating with Hitler, Bosch instructed Heinrich Gattineau (a 
second echelon Farben official who was also an officer in 
the SA) to set up a meeting between Hitler and Heinrich 
Buetefisch, an authority on synthetic oil production.
Before the meeting, which took place in Munich, Gattineau 
and Buetefisch worried that the hydrogenation process was 
too complicated for Hitler to understand. Hitler surprised 
them when he said:
Today an economy without oil is inconceivabls ia 
a Germany which wishes to remain politically 
independent. Therefore German motor fuel must 
become a reality, even if this entails sacrifices. 
Therefore it is urgently necessary that the hydro­
genation of coal be continued.
Hitler then described a program under which he planned to
make Germany self-sufficient in oil with the help of I.G.
Farben. World War I had taught him, he said, that
Germany’s shortage of raw materials made the British
blockade decisive in Germany's defeat. By a program of
self-sufficiency he was determined to change Germany from
a country which lacked raw materials into a self-sufficient
power. Hitler assured Gattineau and Buetefisch that their
company could depend on his support, both financial and
political. Now I.G. Farben acquired an economic interest
0 A United States Military Tribunal, Trials of War 
Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals: October
1946-April 1949. 15 vols. (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1952), vol. VII: The I.G. 
Farben Case, p. 539 (hereafter cited as TWC).
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2 5in the installation of a Hitler government.
Hindenberg appointed Hitler Chancellor on January 
30, 1933. Hitler realized he did not have a firm grip on 
this office. With another Reichstag election scheduled for 
March 5, Hermann Goering called a secret meeting of the 
leading industrialists and financiers to be held at his 
estate of Karinhall on February 20. Hjalmar Schacht, who 
was among the most active members of the financial commu­
nity supporting Hitler, acted as host for the meeting. He 
hoped to raise three million Reichmarks for Hitler’s 
campaign. Georg von Schnitzler, a member of the board of
directors and chairman of the Sales Committee, represented 
2 6I.G. Farben. Bosch had instructed von Schnitzler to
pledge Rm 400,000. That was by far the largest single
27donation pledged. By that action Farben began to show
clear support for Hitler. To solidify Farben's position in
the new regime, Hermann Schmitz (now a Vorstand member) was
appointed an honorary Nazi deputy in the Reichstag in 
28November 1933. Buetefisch joined the SS and became a
25 Arthur Schweitzer, Big Business in the Third 
Reich (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964),
p. 102.
2 6Great Britain, Office of the Attorney-General, 
The Trial of German Major War Criminals. Proceedings of 
the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg. 
1:130-31.
27TWC, VII, pp. 565-68.
28 U.S. v. Krauch. M-892/2/94.
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2 9member of Heinrich Himmler's "Circle of Friends."
Shortly after the March 5 election, Hitler and 
Bosch met for the first time. Hitler assured him that his 
government would fully back the synthetic oil project.
Bosch then moved to a subject that his associates had begged 
him to avoid when talking to Hitler. He warned Hitler that 
the expulsion of Jewish scientists would set German chemis­
try back 100 years. Although Hitler became visibly upset, 
Bosch pursued the subject. Even though Hitler did not 
allow Bosch's outburst to interfere with Farben's synthetic
oil project, he never again would appear in the same room 
30with Bosch. Bosch continued to fight against the dis­
missal of Jewish scientists, but by 1937 all Jewish
officials including a third of the supervisory board had
31been removed from I.G. Farben. The year 1937 also marked 
a drastic change in the character of the Vorstand. Almost 
all of its members joined the Nazi party.
29 Dubois, Devil's Chemists, p. 163.
OQ Lochner, Tycoons and Tyrants, p. 44.
31 Hilberg, Destruction of the European J e w s , p. 58.
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CHAPTER II
COOPERATION WITH HITLER
I.G. Farben was an active, indispensable, and often 
enthusiastic ally of Hitler. Out of ambition, dislike, and 
a fear of communism, the Farben directors saw the Nazis as 
both their opportunity and their protection.^- After World 
War II, Georg von Schnitzler admitted that Nazi foreign 
policy and I.G. Farben's foreign policy were largely 
inseparable.^
In the summer of 1933 General Erhard Milch, state 
secretary of the Aviation Ministry and Goering’s right-hand 
man, was interested in learning whether Farben’s synthetic 
oil was suitable for aviation gasoline. Milch was referred 
to Carl Krauch because he could be relied upon to give the 
most accurate report on the suitability of the gasoline and 
the level of production that could be obtained. Krauch 
promised to investigate Milch’s question. On September 15, 
1933, he submitted a four-year plan for the expansion of
John Kenneth Galbraith, review of T'ne Crime and 
Punishment of I.G. Farben. by Joseph Borkin, in New 
Republic 26, August 1978, p. 35.
2Josiah Dubois, The Devil’s Chemists (Boston: The
Beacon Press, 1952), p. 54.
18
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Germany's production of domestic motor fuel centralized
around Farben's hydrogenation process for synthetic oil.
3The Air Ministry approved Krauch's plan. On December 14, 
1933, a formal contract was signed between I.G. Farben and 
the government. By the terms of the contract Farben was to 
expand the synthetic oil installation at Leuna so that in 
four years it could produce 300,000 to 350,000 tons 
annually. The Reich, in return, promised to guarantee a 
price corresponding to the cost of production, including 
5 percent interest on invested capital and a generous 
depreciation allowance. It also promised to assure the 
sale of all the synthetic oil that Farben could not sell
4through its own outlets. Borkin described the agreement 
as a monumental technical achievement in modern power 
politics. It was only a matter of time, he said, before 
Farben freed Hitler from dependence on foreign oil.^
Once Hitler had a firm agreement on the production
United States Military Tribunal, Trials of War 
Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals: October
1946-April 1949, 15 vols. (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1952), vol. VII: The I.G. 
Farben Case, pp. 571-73 (hereafter cited as TWC).
A
"United States of America v. Carl Krauch et al.," 
14 August 1947 - 30 July 1948, Records of the United States 
Nuernberg War Crimes Trials. Record Group 238, National 
Archives, Washington, D.C., Microfilm Publication M-892, 
roll 2, frame 97 (hereafter cited as U.S. v. Krauch. M-892/ 
2/97).
^Joseph Borkin, The Crime and Punishment of I.G. 
Farben (New York: The Free Press, 1978), p. 60.
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of synthetic oil, he shifted to the next most important 
strategic raw material import, rubber. Farben had devel­
oped the synthetic rubber (buna) process in the late 1920s, 
but when Hitler focused his attention on synthetic rubber, 
Farben's buna operation was minimal.^ In late 1933 
representatives of the Army Ordnance and the Ministry of 
Economics (headed by Hjalmar Schacht) asked Farben to 
resume its work in synthetic rubber. Without the guarantee 
of a sufficient government subsidy, however, Bosch feared 
a repeat of the financial difficulties that beset the 
synthetic oil project and decided not to step up the 
production. The Ministry of Economics, the Army Ordnance, 
and the tire industry thought the cost of buna to be too 
high and would not'make those guarantees.
By the fall of 1934 Hitler was troubled by the 
lagging synthetic rubber production. He appointed his own 
economic adviser, Wilhelm Keppler, as the plenipotentiary 
for raw materials and synthetics. Keppler called a meeting 
of the representatives of I.G. Farben, the Ministry of 
Economics, the Army Ordnance, and the tire industry to tell 
them of Hitler's dissatisfaction. Fritz ter Meer, Farben's 
representative at the meeting, explained the need for 
financial guarantees. Keppler said the production of
Charles F. Phillips. Competition in the Synthetic 
Rubber Industry (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1963), p. 30.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 1
synthetic rubber was a pet project of the Fuehrer and must 
not be delayed. The reluctant parties realized they had no 
choice but to market the buna rubber. On September 11, 
1935, at the Nazi party rally in Nuremberg, Hitler 
announced that Germany had solved the problem of producing 
synthetic rubber, and that the erection of the first German 
factory for this purpose would start at once.^
I.G. Farben already had a small pilot plant at 
Leverkusen but due to Hitler's assurances, Bosch decided to 
build a large-scale buna plant at Schkopau. That plant
would be close enough to Leuna to use the high pressure
equipment of the synthetic oil site. Later, Farben built 
a third plant at Huels. To make this expansion profitable, 
the government subsidized the construction of the plant and
g
placed a high tariff on rubber.
In September 1935 Carl Krauch moved his office from 
Frankfurt to Berlin in order to enhance Farben's coopera­
tion with the Wehrmacht. His new office took the title of
Vermittlungstelle Wehrmacht (army liaison). In a letter to
all plant managers, he explained that the Vorstand created 
the army liaison office
in order to provide systematic cooperation within
the I.G. in the current development of military
^Borkin, Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben. p. 62.
8Burton H. Klein, Germany's Economic Preparations for 
War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959),
p . 45.
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economy, and particularly to assure central treat­
ment of all questions of military economy, military 
policy, and military technique.
On April 27, 1936, Hitler appointed Goering the 
commissar of raw materials and foreign exchange. Goering 
chose Lieutenant Colonel Fritz Loeb of the Air Ministry to 
head his staff. He then asked Bosch to recommend a man 
from I.G. Farben to head up research and development.
Bosch recommended Krauch because he was an expert in syn­
thetic products and he had his office in B e r l i n . E v e n  
though Krauch began to work for the government, he 
maintained his contacts with Farben and his seat on the 
board of directors.
At the Nazi party rally in Nuremberg on September 8, 
1936, Hitler announced his "Four-Year Plan." His goal was 
to make Germany completely self-sufficient in strategic 
war materials such as rubber, gasoline, steel, explosives, 
and chemicals in four years. He entrusted the responsi­
bility for the execution of this program to Goering.
Goering transferred Krauch's research and development staff 
to the office of the Four-Year Plan.
Hitler and Goering assigned a large portion of the
9U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/2/107.
^Dubois, Devil’s Chemists, p. 54.
^ G r e a t  Britain, Office of the Attorney-General,
The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Proceedings of the 
International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg.
1:129.
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Four-Year Plan to I.G. Farben. In the first six months of
the plan, the government invested nearly one billion
Reichmarks, chiefly in power, oil, iron and other metals,
textiles, chemicals, rubber, and explosives. Nearly two-
12thirds of this investment went into Farben products.
Arthur Schweitzer, in Big Business in the Third Reich,
described the Four-Year Plan as a joint project of the
Nazis, the leading generals in the Ministry of War, and
I.G. Farben, who together formed a new relationship in
13economic matters.
In December 1937 Paul Koerner, Goering's deputy,
noticed certain disparities in the Four-Year Plan figures
prepared by Loeb's office. He asked Krauch about Loeb’s
estimates. Krauch- concluded that Loeb's figures were too
conservative and could not possibly fulfill the projections
of the Four-Year Plan. Krauch warned Koerner that the use
14of Loeb's figures could be disastrous. Koerner took 
Krauch's warnings to Goering, who invited both Loeb and 
Krauch to Karinhall to discuss Loeb's figures. Krauch 
impressed Goering by explaining his views in greatest 
detail. He proved to Goering that Loeb's figures were
"^Telford Taylor, Sword and Swastika (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1952), pp. 123-24.
1 ̂ Arthur Schweitzer, Big Business in the Third 
Reich (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964),
p. 547.
14TWC, VII, p. 1001.
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wrong. Goering decided to ask Krauch to prepare a better 
plan. Krauch worked on a.revision at Karinhall; and on 
June 30, 1938, he handed Goering an accelerated plan for 
the production of explosives, gunpowder, and chemical- 
warfare agents. Less than two weeks later he added a 
supplement which covered synthetic oil, buna rubber, and 
light metals. This plan came to be known as the "Karinhall- 
Plan" or "Krauch-Plan." On August 22, Goering sealed his 
approval of the Karinhall Plan by putting Krauch in charge 
of the entire chemical production of the Four-Year Plan 
with the title of Plenipotentiary General for Special 
Questions of Chemical Production.
I.G. Farben factories worked overtime to make the 
Four-Year Plan a reality. By. 1943 Farben’:-. factories were 
producing large percentages of German production of the
following products:
Pet.
M a g n e s i u m ..............................88
N i c k e l ............ . ................. 95
P l a s t i c s ..............................90
D y e s t u f f s ..............................98
Pharmaceuticals ...................  55
G u n p o w d e r ..............................70
B u n a ................................. 100
G a s o l i n e ..............................23
Synthetic lubricating oil . . . .  100
M e t h a n o l ............................ 100
See Berenice A. Carroll, Design for Total War: 
Arms and Economics in the Third Reich (The Hague, Nether­
lands: Mouton and Co., 1968), pp. 135-37; TWC, VII,
pp. 890-93.
"^Richard Sasuly, I.G. Farben (New York: Boni and
Gaer, Inc., 1947), pp. 296-97, figures compiled by the 
Bernstein investigation of I.G. Farben.
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Josiah Dubois stressed the importance of Farben goods in the
invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939:
As the planes took off in the drizzle . . .
Farben wipers cleared their windshields. . . .
The pilots peeked out of Farben aluminum fuse­
lages and flipped their magnesium wings— 85 
percent of which had been made by Farben. They 
flew on Farben gasoline, their engines made of 
Farben nickel and lubricated by Farben. . . .
Four out of every ten foot soldiers were warmed 
by Farben textiles, wore Farben plastic helmets, 
were outfitted with a dozen other Farben articles 
from mess kits to puttees. . . .  All the tanks, 
the half-tracks, the squad cars rolled on buna 
rubber
I.G. Farben followed the Wehrmacht throughout most 
of Europe and established control over the European chemi­
cal industry. The company used its expert technical 
knowledge and resources to plunder and exploit the chemical
industries of Europe and to enrich itself from unlawful
18acquisitions. After the Anschluss in March 1938, Farben 
took over the firm of Skodawerke-Wetzler, the largest 
chemical company in Austria. The owners asked an extremely 
low price because Farben promised to protect their lives. 
Farben then took over two other large firms, Austrian
19Dynamit Nobel A.G. and Carbidwerke Deutschmatrei A.G.
Shortly after the signing of the Munich Pact, Hermann 
Schmitz (who became chairman of the Vorstand in 1935) sent
^D u b o i s ,  Devil’s Chemists, pp. 318-19. 
18TWC, VII, p. 41.
■^Dubois, Devil’s Chemists, pp. 90-92.
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the following telegram to Hitler in order to lay the 
groundwork for the takeover of the Czechoslovakian chemical 
industry:
Profoundly impressed by the return of the 
Sudetenland to the Reich, which you, my Fuehrer, 
have achieved, the I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. puts 
an amount of half a million reichmarks at your 
disposal for use in the Sudetenland territory. ^
After the occupation of the Sudetenland, Farben began
negotiations with Prager Verein, Czechoslovakia’s largest
chemical company. When the company directors asked the
Czech government for help, they were told to manage on
their own as best they could. Due to the heavy pressure
from the Farben representatives, the Prager Verein direc-
21tors decided to sell.
In Poland there were four large chemical companies: 
Boruta. W o l a , Winnica, and Pabianice. After the invasion 
Farben had little trouble taking over Boruta, W ola, and 
Winnica because they were locally owned. The fourth,
Pabjanice, was owned by a Swiss company. The Swiss 
directors wired Farben that they had informed the Swiss 
government of Farben's attempts to take over Pab janice.
The Farben directors decided not to pursue Pab janice 
because they did not want to harm relations between Germany 
and Switzerland. Switzerland was too valuable as a
2<̂ TWC, VII, p. 591, Nuremberg Industrialists (NI)
2795.
21Ibid., p. 43.
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22clearing house of foreign exchange for Germany.
The largest chemical company in Norway was Norsk-
Hydro . Prior to the German invasion in 1940, French
interests controlled 60 percent of the company, Farben
about 25 percent. With the help of representatives of the
German government, Farben forced the French to give up
their control of Norsk-Hydro. As a result Farben and the
German government controlled the Norwegian chemical indus- 
23t ry.
After Germany conquered France, I.G. Farben turned 
its attention towards controlling the French chemical 
industry. In Farben's view France was the key to domina­
tion of the European chemical industry. Farben representa­
tives threatened French chemical leaders that if they did 
not cooperate, their companies would be classified as 
Jewish concerns and their plants would be confiscated. The 
leading chemical company in France was the Etablissements 
Kuhlmann. Its dominant figure, Joseph Frossard, firmly 
believed that the organization of the European economy must 
come under German leadership because it seemed inevitable 
that Germany would win the war. Under his direction 
Kuhlmann absorbed many of the other French chemical com­
panies. Those not taken over by Kuhlmann could only
22Dubois, Devil's Chemists, pp. 112-13. 
23TWC, VII, p. 45.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 8
survive by following Frossard. On March 12, 1941, Kuhlmann
and I.G. Farben agreed on the formation of a new company
officially named Societ^ Anonyme de Matieres Colorants et
Produits Chimiques (Francolor for short). The agreement
gave Farben a 51 percent interest in the company, Kuhlmann
the remaining 49 percent. Frossard became president while
three members of the Vorstand sat on Francolor's board of
directors: von Schnitzler, ter Meer, and Dr. Otto Ambros.
In making this agreement, the French companies suirendered
their dyestuffs and intermediate plants as well as their
24patents, licenses, manufacturing processes and stocks.
On November 8, 1940, the Reich Ministry of 
Economics asked I.G. Farben to expand its buna production 
from 100,000 to 150,000 tons per year. The ministry pro­
posed that half of the expansion take place within Germany 
and the other half in a new plant in Silesia. The 
expansion was to take place under the direction of Carl
Krauch in his capacity as the Plenipotentiary General for 
25Chemistry. The expansion of the synthetic rubber 
facilities was necessary to fulfill the enormous require­
ments projected for the invasion of the Soviet Union.
After the war, Carl Krauch stated that Goering suggested 
the Silesian territory because he expected retaliation
2^See Dubois, Devil's Chemists, pp. 290-94; Borkin, 
Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben. pp. 101-6.
25U.S. v. Krauch. M-892/44/593-94, NI-11781.
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after the failure of the Battle of Britain in the autumn of
1940. He wanted to decentralize the buna factories and
26build one out of bombing range of the British.
I.G. Farben already had two large buna plants at
Schopau and Huels. Krauch decided to build a third plant
at Ludwigshafen in order to utilize the hydrogenation
equipment of that synthetic oil plant. For the fourth
plant he considered two sites, one in Norway and one in
Polish Silesia. He had to be careful to choose the best
possible site because Farben had to build a brand new plant
which could not utilize the hydrogenation facilities of an
adjoining synthetic oil plant. In January 1941 Krauch
assigned Otto Ambros, one of I.G. Farben*s top buna
chemists, to survey the Silesian territory. Ambros studied
the maps of the area and decided on a site between the
towns of Auschwitz and Monowitz. At the juncture of three
rivers, the Weichsel, the Przemsa, and the Sola, the site
offered an adequate water supply. The area also had three
coal mines, large deposits of lime, and the Reich railroad,
which afforded excellent transportation. The site was
favorably located from the point of view of possible air
pollution. He reported to Krauch that the building site
would satisfy, in every respect, the requirements for the
27building of the new buna plant.
^ T W C ,  VIII, p. 652, testimony of Carl Krauch. 
27U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/602-4, NI-11783.
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Although the Silesian site fulfilled the technical 
requirements of the new plant, Krauch and the Farben buna 
experts had to consider other advantages and risks involved 
before making a final decision. On January 18, 1941,
Ambros met with Dr. Kurt Eisfeld and chief engineer 
Camill Santo to consider the lack of skilled labor. The 
Auschwitz area was completely agricultural. That meant 
the people of the area knew little of industrial work, and 
trained workers would have to be brought in to work on the 
plant. The town of Auschwitz was made up of 4,000 Jews,
7,000 Poles, and 2,000 German peasants. The SS was to 
expel the Jews and Poles from the area and put them into 
concentration camps. Their homes would serve as suitable 
quarters to accommodate construction workers and later on 
factory staff. Ambros, Eisfeld, and Santo thought the site 
was large enough to build an adjoining synthetic oil
i * 28plant.
On January 31, Santo and another engineer, Max 
Faust, met with Reich representatives from the Silesian 
area. The officials told Santo and Faust that the concen­
tration camp, which already had 7,000 prisoners, was to 
be expanded tc hold the Jews and Poles of Auschwitz. They 
discussed the possibility of using inmates from the camp 
for the plant construction. The Farben representatives 
were told they would have to wait for approval from
28Ibid., M-892/44/605-9, NI-11784.
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29Himmler.
On February 6, 1941, ter Meer and Ambros attended 
two meetings to discuss the Auschwitz site. At the first 
meeting with representatives of the Reich Ministry of 
Economics, Ambros explained that the Auschwitz site would 
involve very large financial risks on the part of I.G. 
Farben because the area was not near any other industrial 
installations. Farben, however, did not want the govern­
ment to finance the construction because the firm assumed 
that the plant would prove to be a profitable venture after 
the war. Ambros did propose, however, that the government 
keep the price of rubber high until the cost of the plant 
construction could be paid. He expected the Auschwitz 
plant to start rubber production in the second half of
1943. The government representatives expressed their
30agreement with his suggestions. Ter Meer and Ambros' 
second meeting was with Krauch. At that meeting Ambros 
emphasized the suitability of the Auschwitz site. The 
only problem, he said, was the procurement of suitable 
labor. His only solution, at the time, was to bring in 
German workers through an extensive settlement program. 
Krauch decided, he said, to drop the Norway site from 
consideration and to build the new buna plant at Auschwitz.
29Ibid ., M-892/44/610-14, NI-11785.
30See Ibid., M-892/44/615-18, NI-11112; Ibid., 
M-892/44/633, NI-7604, testimony of Christian Schneider.
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The plant would be known as I.G. Auschwitz. He also 
announced that plans were being made to erect a synthetic 
oil plant at the same site. Since Himmler controlled the 
Silesian territory, they made plans to contact him in 
connection with the settlement of German laborers in 
Auschwitz .3*
After a visit to the Auschwitz area, Eisfeld 
informed Ambros that most of the buildings belonging to 
Jews and Poles were not suitable for housing Germans. A 
new large-scale settlement would have to be built along 
with the plant. Noting that the eviction of the Jews and 
Poles would create a great shortage of laborers, he sug­
gested that they contact the Reich Leader SS of the area
32to procure the needed laborers.
In mid-February 1941 Krauch asked Goering to
supply the new Auschwitz plant with the needed labor. He
described Goering's cooperation in a letter he wrote:
At my request, the Reichmarshall issued special 
decrees a few days ago to the supreme Reich 
authorities concerned, in which he again partic­
ularly emphasized the urgency of the project, and 
is constantly devoting his particular attention 
to the progress of those tasks of military economic 
production which have been entrusted to your care.
In these decrees, the Reichmarshall obligated the 
offices concerned to meet your requirement in 
skilled workers and laborers at once, even at the 
expense of other important building projects or
31Ibid., M-892/44/619-21, NI-11113.
32Ibid., M-892/44/626, NI-11782.
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33plans which are essential to the war economy.
On February 18, Goering asked Himmler to expel all the Jews 
from the town of Auschwitz, but to allow the Poles to 
remain, temporarily, to work on the plant. He also asked
Himmler to supply Farben with the largest possible number
34of workers from the Auschwitz concentration camp.
On March 1, Himmler ordered that the Jews in the 
town of Auschwitz be expelled as quickly as possible so 
that their apartments could be made available to accommo­
date the workers building the buna plant. The Polish 
residents suitable for employment were not to be expelled. 
He ordered Oswald Pohl, the Inspector of Concentration 
Camps and the Chief of the Main Economic and Administrative 
Office (WVHA), to-supply the buna project with inmate 
laborers. He appointed SS Lieutenant General Karl Wolff,
the chief of his personal staff, to act as liaison between
35the SS and the buna plant management. I.G. Farben
36became a very important customer of the SS.
33TWC, VIII, p. 359, NI-11938.
34Ibid., pp. 354-55, NI-1240.
35U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/663, NI-11086.
o
Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European 
Jews (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961), p. 590.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER III
I.G. AUSCHWITZ AND MONOWITZ
In his autobiography, Rudolph Hoess, the commandant 
of Auschwitz, wrote, "Before the war, the concentration 
camps had served the purpose of self-protection, but 
during the war, according to the will of the Reichsfuehrer 
SS, they became a means to an end."* The camps were to 
serve the war effort in munitions production, and as many 
inmates as possible were to become armament workers. In 
March 1941, when Himmler issued Goering's orders to accom­
modate I.G. Farben's labor needs, he visited Auschwitz.
He gave orders to Hoess to enlarge the camp to hold
100.000 prisoners, with 10,000 to be allocated to the
synthetic rubber factory. "At that time a camp containing
210.000 prisoners was considered exceptionally large."
After the war, Hoess stated that I.G. Farben was given 
preference in procuring concentration camp inmates. He 
testified that the concentration camps did not offer labor 
to industry. Instead, inmates were sent after industry
*Rudolph Hoess, Commandant of Auschwitz, trans. 
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3made requests for prisoner labor.
In the summer of 1941 Himmler told Hoess that 
Auschwitz had been selected as a site for the extermina­
tion of the Jews. He told him that Auschwitz was selected 
because of its easy rail access, its isolation from popu­
lated areas, and the physical possibilities that its 
location afforded for concealment and camouflage. The 
Nazis also favored the site because the corpses of 
millions of Jews could be deposited there without contam­
inating primary German soil. Himmler preferred Auschwitz 
to the other Polish death camps because of the fraudulent 
status it had acquired through the plans to build the buna 
plant. The Jews could be sent east thinking they were 
going to work on the plant without suspecting the real 
purpose of their trip. Therefore, Auschwitz had the 
double task of providing forced labor for I.G. Farben 
while serving as a center for the mass extermination of 
the Jews.^
O
See Ibid., p. 235; "United States of America v. 
Carl Krauch et al.," 14 August 1947 - 30 July 1948,
Records of the United States Nuernberg War Crimes Trials. 
Record Group 238, National Archives, Washington, D.C., 
Microfilm Publication M-892, roll 43, frame 1078 (here­
after cited as U.S. v. Krauch. M-892/43/1078), Nuremberg 
Industrialists (NI) 4434, affidavit of Rudolph Hoess.
4See Lucy S. Dawidowicz, The War Against the Jews. 
1933-1945, 7th ed. (New York: Bantom Books, 1981),
p. 175; Nora Levin, The Holocaust: The Destruction of
European Jewry (New York: T. Y. Crowell Co., 1968),
p. 292; Gerald Reitlinger, The Final Solution (New York:
A. S. Barnes, 1961), pp. 104-5; Roger Manvell and Heinrich 
Fraenkel, Himmler (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1965),
p. 122.
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In the month that followed the issuance of 
Himmler’s orders, Farben made the final plant preparations. 
First of all, the management was organized. Dr. Otto 
Ambros was to direct the buna plant and Dr. Heinrich 
Buetefisch was to head the synthetic oil plant. Neither 
one of those men was to have an office on the Auschwitz 
site; nevertheless, Ambros communicated with I.G.
Auschwitz from his office in Ludwigshafen and Buetefisch 
from his office in Leuna. Each man visited the plant site 
only two or three times a year. Both had representatives 
in Auschwitz to deal with technical problems associated 
with construction. Ambros was represented by Dr. Kurt 
Eisfeld, and Buetefisch by Dr. Karl Braus. Buetefisch was 
also named chairman of the Fuerstengrube mining company 
which Farben had acquired. That mine was to be worked by 
inmate labor in order to supply inexpensive coal. At 
first, chief engineer Santo was in charge of all plant 
construction. Max Faust directed the building of the 
synthetic oil plant and Walter Duerrfeld was in charge of 
building the buna plant. By 1944 Duerrfeld had become 
managing director of all the Auschwitz plants.
At the first building conference, held on March 24, 
1941, the plant management of I.G. Auschwitz addressed the 
problem of working with the Reich authorities in the area. 
They decided to hold a Founders’ Meeting on April 7 in the 
neighboring town of Kattowitz. At the Founders’ Meeting, 
all the competent Reich authorities in the area would
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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become familiar with the Auschwitz building project. At. 
the conference Duerrfeld reported on some preliminary 
discussions he had had with SS Lieutenant General Karl 
Wolff. Wolff promised him that at least 700 inmates would 
be assigned to the building site, that all free labor in 
Auschwitz would be utilized, and that Hoess would be 
responsible for guarding the building site.^
On March 27, Buetefisch and Duerrfeld met with 
Wolff, in the presence of SS Brigadier General Richard 
Gluecks (Inspector of Concentration Camps), to contract 
the services of the concentration camp. Buetefisch was 
chosen to negotiate with the SS because he was a member of 
Himmler*s "Circle of Friends." The two parties agreed 
that I.G. Auschwitz would be supplied with 1,000 inmates 
in 1941 and 3,000 in 1942. Buetefisch was told there were 
not too many skilled workers in the camp and not to count 
on many in the future. The working time was to be ten to 
eleven hours a day in the summer and at least nine in the 
winter. Farben would pay the SS three Reichmarks per day 
for unskilled workers and four Reichmarks per day for 
skilled workers. The payment included transportation to 
and from the plant site, food, and shelter.^
5U.S. v. Krauch. M-892/44/695-99, NI-11115.
^United States Military Tribunal, Trials of War 
Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals; October 
1946-April 1949. 15 vols. (Washington, D.C.: United States
Government Printing Office, 1952), vol. VIII: The I.G.
Farben C a s e , pp. 374-75 (hereafter cited as T W C ) , NI-15148.
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Wolff told Buetefisch that more inmates could be 
made available for the plant if enough Kapos could be 
obtained from the other concentration camps. A Kapo 
(derived from the French caporal) was the name given 
throughout the Nazi concentration camp system for a minor 
supervisor or ’’straw boss’’ who was chosen from among the 
inmates. He was not chosen because of his race, religion, 
or political beliefs, but because of his long criminal 
record. Many of the SS elite reportedly tried to remain 
as aloof as possible from the hell that they had created 
and that it was their duty to maintain. Bodily control of 
the inmates passed increasingly into the hands of the 
Kapos. whose conduct was far more savage than that of the 
SS.^ That was an important development, because no SS 
guards were allowed inside the plant area after June 14, 
1942, when I.G. Farben built a fence around the perimeter. 
SS guards patrolled the area around the plant to ensure 
that no inmate escaped, but I.G. foremen controlled theg
inner area and dictated the work pace to the Kapos.
At the second construction conference held on 
April 3, 1941, Duerrfeld reported on a discussion he had 
with Hoess. Hoess had said that he would support the
^Manvell and Fraenkel, Himmler, p. 122.
8See U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/647, NI-9542, 
testimony of Otto Ambros; Josiah Dubois, The Devil’s 
Chemists (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1952), pp. 166-67.
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construction management to the best of his ability. He was 
sorry that he could not provide more inmates in 1941, but 
he could promise them 4,000 in 1942. Duerrfeld also
9reported that each Kapo would supervise twenty inmates.
At the Founders* Meeting on April 7, the leading 
I.G. Farben representatives were Otto Ambros and Dr. 
Johannes Eckell. Dr. Eckell served the dual role as a 
Farben representative specializing in buna production and 
as a representative of Krauch’s office of Special 
Questions of Chemical Production. Ambros announced that 
Farben had received an additional order to build a syn­
thetic oil plant with a capacity of 75,000 tons per year. 
Eckell emphasized the high priority of the Auschwitz 
plants to the government representatives. Ambros then 
declared that the plant construction would require up to
15,000 laborers, both skilled and unskilled. He announced 
Hoess’ plans to provide concentration camp inmates as 
unskilled labor, but he could only speculate on the 
sources of skilled labor. Eckell stated that this problem 
could be solved by conscripting labor if necessary.
Ambros concluded by asserting that I.G. Farben was deter­
mined to do everything in its power to build up a strong 
enterprise whose influence would become no less important 
than that of its numerous plants in Germany. In that way
9U.S. v. Krauch. M-892/44/705, NI-11116.
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I.G. Farben was performing its moral duty of doing its very 
best to make this new enterprise "a strong corner-stone for 
a virile, healthy Germandom in the E a s t . " ^
On April 12, 1941, Ambros wrote to ter Meer about 
the success of the Founders' Meeting. He reported that 
Dr. Eckell had proved his worth in getting the cooperation 
of the local government officials. Ambros also observed 
that "our new friendship with the SS is proving very 
profitable.
Construction began on I.G. Auschwitz after the 
Founders* Meeting. The laborers consisted mostly of 
Germans and Poles from the town of Auschwitz and the con­
centration camp inmates. I.G. Farben brought in most of 
its skilled workers from Germany. Despite the cooperation 
of the Nazi hierarchy, numerous shortages in materials and 
labor plagued the project. The biggest problem was the 
low productivity of the unskilled laborers, especially the 
concentration camp inmates. The SS believed that the only 
way to get the inmates to work was for the Kapos to beat 
them, but Farben representatives noticed the deleterious 
effect that brutality had on the free laborers in the 
immediate vicinity. In August 1941 they informed the 
board of directors that those "exceedingly unpleasant
10Ibid., M-892/44/725-26, NI-11117.
11Ibid., M-892/44/731, NI-11118.
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scenes" were
beginning to have a demoralizing effect on the 
free workers (Poles), as well as on the Germans.
We have therefore asked that they should refrain 
from carrying out this flogging on the construc­
tion site and transfer it to the inside of the 
concentration c a m p .
Faust reported that, by December, free Poles had attained
50 percent of the efficiency of the German workers and the
13inmates 30 percent. The plant management changed its
attitude toward the use of force to raise the laborers'
work performances:
The work, particularly of the Poles and inmates, 
continues to leave much room for improvement,.
. . . Every type of pressure, even sending them 
(Poles) to the concentration camp, remains with­
out result. In this respect, it is only to be 
regretted that the construction management itself 
has no disciplinary powers. Our experience so far 
has shown that only brute force has any effect on 
these people.1^
Despite the shortages in materials and the low 
productivity of the unskilled laborers, relations between 
the Farben management and the SS remained cordial. 
Representatives of I.G. Farben took part in an SS Christmas 
party "which was very festive and which ended up alcohol- 
ically gay."^3 In return representatives of the concen­
tration camp were invited to the Farben staff Christmas
12TWC, VIII, p. 393, NI-14543.
13U.S. v. Krauch. M-892/44/839, NI-11130.
14TWC, VIII, p. 405, NI-14556.
15Ibid., p. 410, NI-15253.
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party
At the beginning of 1942 Ambros, Pohl, Gluecks, 
and Hans Frank, the Governor-General of Poland, met at 
I.G. Auschwitz. At the meeting Pohl expressed his 
appreciation for the work that I.G. Farben had done, and 
he repeated his willingness to support I.G. Auschwitz in 
every respect, especially in the labor commitments the SS 
had made in 1941. Pohl assured Ambros and Duerrfeld that 
Himmler had given I.G. Farben priority in the employment 
of inmate labor.
Due to a shortage of inmates in late 1941, the 
Farben plant management decided to utilize foreign workers 
who were being recruited in constantly increasing numbers 
in the occupied territories. These workers became 
available after Fritz Sauckel, the Plenipotentiary General 
for the Allocation of Labor, started the forced importation 
of foreign laborers on April 6, 1942. At first, I.G. 
Auschwitz used Poles, Slovaks, and Frenchmen; and later, 
Italians, Ukrainians, Belgians, Croatians, and British 
POWs. Farben was responsible for the housing, clothing, 
and feeding of foreign workers. They were quartered 
separately according to nationality. Farben's chief 
problem with foreign workers was that they frequently ran
Ibxd .
17See Ibid., p. 540, NI-15253; U.S. v. Krauch. 
M-892/43/1070, NI-382, affidavit of Oswald Pohl.
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away because the SS did not guard them as carefully as they
18guarded the inmates.
The winter of 19A1-42 was an extremely harsh one 
for the inmates who worked at l.G. Auschwitz. Even though 
the inmates were poorly clothed and fed, Farben still 
expected them to do heavy construction work. Those who 
became too ill or weak to work were transferred to 
Birkenau, where they were gassed. In the words of Joseph
19Borkin, Farben reduced an inmate to a human raw material. 
Between working hours the inmates had to march a total of 
fourteen kilometers to and from the plant site. In October
1941 the Farben plant management complained that the 
inmates were arriving too late and leaving too early.28 
Farben could do little about -that because the inmates had 
to be marched to and from the camp under SS guard during 
the daylight hours. They could not leave until after the 
morning roll call and had to return for the evening roll 
call. To add to l.G. Farben's problems, in the summer of
1942 a typhus epidemic broke out in the Auschwitz main 
camp and denied the plant that very important source of
18See Ibid., M-892/44/652-53, NI-9542, testimony 
of Otto Ambros; Benjamin B. Ferencz, Less Than Slaves: 
Jewish Forced Labor and the Quest for Compensation 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 19.
19Joseph Borkin, The Crime and Punishment of l.G. 
Farben (New York: The Free Press, 1978), p. 126.
20U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/750, NI-11127.
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1 k 21labor.
By the summer of 1942 l.G. Auschwitz was
approaching a financial crisis. Plant construction was
far behind schedule, and l.G. Farben's investment was in
jeopardy. In June the Vorstand voted to appropriate five
million Reichmarks to construct a concentration camp next
22to the plant site. Farben gave the concentration camp 
the name of Monowitz. In this facility Farben assumed 
responsibility for the housing, feeding, and health of the 
inmates; the SS remained in charge of the security, 
punishment, and supply of inmates. Even though l.G.
Farben owned the camp, Monowitz had all the equipment of 
the typical Nazi concentration camp. It had electrically 
charged barbed wire, four to six watchtowers, armed guards, 
and the standard inscription spanning the entrance gates: 
Arbeit Macht Frei (Work Will Make You Free).23 l.G.
Farben profited from a concentration camp close to the 
plant site. The inmates were no longer drained of their 
already limited energy by the long marches to and from the 
Auschwitz main camp, and Farben could get the full day of
See TWC, VIII, p. 795, testimony of Walter 
Duerrfeld; John Mendelsohn, ed., The Holocaust, 18 vols. 
(New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1982), 11:272.
22TWC, VIII, pp. 437-38, NI-14524.
23See U.S. v. Krauch. M-892/44/648, NI-9542, 
testimony of Otto Ambros; Ferencz, Less Than Slaves, 
p . 25.
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work it originally contracted for. Security improved,
discipline was more effective, and Farben had greater and
more immediate control of the inmates. Most important of
all, Farben reduced its costs. By October 1942, 4,500
inmates moved into Monowitz. At the camp's last roll call
24in January 1945 there were 10,244 inmates.
While l.G. Farben was building Monowitz, Himmler
decided that Auschwitz would be the main clearing house
for the extermination of the Jews. Himmler was impressed
by the deception of the huge buna project and the success
that Hoess had had with Zyclon-B gas. Zyclon-B was a more
effective killer than the carbon monoxide used at Belsec,
Sobibor, and Treblinka. The German firm Degesch (short
for Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Schaedlingsbekaempfung)
developed Zyclon-B to exterminate rodents and insects in
enclosed spaces. Only six to seven kilograms were needed
to kill 1,500 people. Degesch had a monopoly on the
production of the gas. Its only drawback was that it
deteriorated within three months and therefore could not
25be stockpiled by the SS.
Three corporations owned Degesch: 15 percent by
Ota Krans and Erich Kulka, The Death Factory: 
Documents on Auschwitz, trans. Stephen Jolly (Oxford: 
Pergamon Press, 1966), p. 280.
25 See Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European 
Jews (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961), p. 567; Kazimierz
Smolen, Auschwitz, 1940-1945. trans. Krystyna Michalik 
(Pans twowe: Auschwitz Museum, 1961), p. 49.
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the Goldschmidt concern, 42.5 percent by Degussa (short for 
Deutsche Gold und Silberscheidenanstalt). and 42.5 percent 
by l.G. Farben. The managing director was Dr. Gerhard 
Peters, and the chairman of the administrative council was 
Wilhelm Mann, one of four members of the Farben Vorstand.
The other three were Carl Wurster, Dr. Heinrich Hoerlein, 
and Max Brueggemann. A Farben plant in Uerdingen produced 
the stabilizer used in the Zyclon-B. Although Degesch was 
a small company employing less than fifty people, the 
increased demands for the gas gave it a profitable monopoly. 
In 1942 Degesch supplied Auschwitz with 7,478 kilograms of 
Zyclon-B. Deliveries increased to 12,174 kilograms in 
1943. From 1941 to 1944 l.G. Farben earned almost 
Rm 300,000 as its share from the sale of the gas. After 
the war, Dr. Peters stood trial on eight different occa­
sions before West German courts. He was tried because he 
had been informed about the use of the gas. He was
acquitted due to his defense that the Zyclon-B gave those
26people who were doomed to die an easy death.
Even with the construction of Monowitz, plant con­
struction still suffered from a labor shortage, a problem
26See Ibid.; Hilberg, Destruction of the European 
J e w s , pp. 568-69; The Working Group of Former Prisoners of 
the Auschwitz Concentration Camp of the Committee of Anti- 
Fascist Resistance Fighters in the German Democratic 
Republic, IG-Farben. Auschwitz. Mass Murder; on the Guilt 
of IG-Farben From the Documents on the Auschwitz Trial 
(Berlin: n.p., 1964), pp. 26-27.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
prevalent throughout the Reich. One of the ironies of the 
extermination process was the labor gap that the Jews could 
have filled in Germany's war effort. The SS authorities 
in charge of the camp labor allocation were infuriated by 
the large number of Jews sent directly to gas chambers.
SS Lieutenant Colonel Gerhardt Maurer and his assistant 
SS Captain Karl Sommer, who were the labor allocation 
officers of the WVHA, were responsible for the labor 
supplied to l.G. Auschwitz.
Two incidents in early 1943 illustrate the impor­
tance that "The Final Solution of the Jewish Problem" had 
over the labor crisis. On January 27, 1943, Sommer 
informed Hoess that 5,000 Theresienstadt Jews were being 
sent to Auschwitz; He asked that the selection of pros­
pective workers be made carefully because of their 
importance to l.G. Farben. After some delay, SS Lieuten­
ant, later Captain, Albrecht Schwarz, the labor-commitment 
officer for the Auschwitz outer camps, replied that only 
120 of the Theresienstadt Jews were fit for work. He 
explained that the men were too frail and the females were 
mostly children. On March 3, Maurer announced that 
skilled Jewish workers were beginning to leave Berlin.
He reminded Hoess that l.G. Farben's needs were to be 
filled from these transports and asked that the trains be 
unloaded as near the factory as possible instead of the 
"usual place." Five transports brought a total of 5,837 
Jews from Berlin, 3,316 of whom were sent directly to the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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gas chambers. Schwarz told Maurer that the transports had
too many old men and too many women and children. The
buna works he said needed young, healthy bodies to do the
27heavy construction work. In his book Infiltration.
Albert Speer remarked that "the treatment of the Jewish
28question is a spectacle of German disunity."
Despite the labor shortage, Krauch appeared to be
pleased by the progress of l.G. Auschwitz. By the summer
of 1942 the synthetic oil plant was beginning to produce
gasoline. On July 27, 1943, he urged Himmler to build
another large synthetic factory similar to l.G. Auschwitz:
I was particularly pleased to hear . . . that you 
may possibly aid the expansion of another synthetic 
factory . . .  in a similar way as was done at 
Auschwitz, by making available inmates of your 
camps if necessary. I have also written to Minister 
Speer to this effect and would be grateful if you 
would continue sponsoring and aiding us in this 
matter.29
By 1943 l.G. Farben was no longer the only indus­
trial concern with a plant at Auschwitz. On March 5, the 
Krupp fuse plant in Essen was bombed out. By March 17, 
plans had been made to move the remaining machinery to 
Auschwitz, out of range of the Allied bombers. Krupp also
See Reitlinger, Final Solution, p. 162; Hilberg, 
Destruction of the European Jews, p. 587. The number of 
Jewish deportees was calculated from these two sources.
28 Albert Speer, Infiltration, trans. Joachim 
Neugroschel (New York: MacMillian, 1981), p. 259.
29TWC, VIII, p. 532, NI-10040.
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chose to draw upon the supply of inexpensive inmate labor.
Krupp was later followed by Siemens-Schuskert (part of the
Siemens electrical concern) and other German firms. For
the rest of the war, the average number of inmates in the
30Auschwitz outer camps was about 40,000.
Auschwitz*thus acquired a number of industrial 
tenants who required inmates for their plants. But 
because of the gassings, the SS still could not supply all 
the inmates requested by the industrial concerns. As 
early as December 28, 1942, Himmler had ordered the death- 
rate reduced. He demanded monthly reports of progress, 
yet the number of gassings increased. In July 1943 he 
sent an SS judge advocate, Conrad Morgen, to institute 
prosecutions at the main camps. Morgen's investigations 
revealed that gold smuggling was a cause of the increased 
gassings at Auschwitz. As a result of that investigation, 
Auschwitz experienced a shake-up in the camp administra­
tion. Himmler suspended Ernst Graebner, the Political 
Officer in the Auschwitz main camp, and transferred Hoess. 
On November 1, Hoess became the Head of the Central Office 
in the Inspectorate of Concentration Camps in Oswald 
Pohl's office at Oranienburg (although he was sent back 
to Auschwitz in J u l y ^1944 to direct the gassings of
30 See Hilberg, Destruction of the European Jews, 
p. 598; Martin Gilbert, Auschwitz and the Allies (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1981), p. 143.
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400,000 Hungarian Jews). SS Lieutenant Colonel Arthur 
Liebehenschel, who switched positions with Hoess, became 
the new commandant of Auschwitz. On November 22, at 
Pohl's suggestion, the SS divided Auschwitz into three 
parts: Auschwitz I (the Auschwitz main camp), commanded
by Liebehenschel; Auschwitz II (Birkenau), commanded by 
SS Major Fritz Hartjenstein; and Auschwitz III (consisting 
of l.G. Auschwitz, Monowitz, and about thirty-nine sub­
camps), commanded by SS Captain Schwarz. Liebehenschel
31remained commandant of the whole camp.
Liebehenschel instituted some reforms at Auschwitz, 
including the punishment of some Kapos and Blockfuehrers. 
but this had little effect on the inmates who worked at 
l.G. Auschwitz. Their treatment followed Sauckel’s guide­
lines concerning the treatment of laborers: "All the men
must be fed, sheltered and treated in such a way as to
exploit them to the highest possible extent at the lowest
32conceivable degree of expenditure."
When the inmates arrived at Monowitz, the SS
See Gerald Reitlinger, The SS: Alibi of a
Nation. 1922-1945. 2nd ed. (London: Arms and Armour Press,
1981), p. 263; Reitlinger, Final Solution, p. 453; Jadwiga 
Bedwinska„ e d ., KL Auschwitz Seen by the SS: Hoss, Broad.
Kremer (W. Oswiecimin: Publications of PafTstwowe Muzeum,
1972), p. 74n.
32 Great Britain, Office of the Attorney-General,
The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Proceedings of the 
International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg.
20:515 (hereafter cited as TMWC).
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greeted them in the following manner: "You are all con­
demned to die, but the execution of your sentence will take
33a little while." After entering the camp, the inmates 
moved into their sleeping quarters; three inmates had to 
share a bed. Usually 400 inmates slept in a block equipped 
with facilities for 162. The camp sewerage system was 
insufficient, the garbage pits overflowed, and the water
was contaminated. Warnings against drinking the water were
. 34 issued.
The diet was inadequate in view of the work
required of the inmates. If the inmates were lucky, they
could drink half a cup of coffee substitute for breakfast.
Their evening meal consisted of a quarter of a loaf of
bread made from wood dust along with either a slice of
sausage, a spoonful of white cheese, or a spoonful of
syrup. Farben at noontime also gave the inmates a liter
of soup, a nutritional aid not available to inmates in
other concentration camps. This "Buna Soup" was made from
boiled nettles (a common wild plant with prickly leaves)
35or other greens, sometimes with a piece of potato.
Ambros said that Farben introduced the noontime soup to
33U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/1178, NI-12373, affi­
davit of Robert Waitz.
34TWC, VIII, pp. 575-77, affidavit of Arnost Tauber.
35U.S. v. Krauch. M-892/44/981, NI-4830, affidavit 
of Rudolf Vitek.
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3 6improve the state of health of the inmates.
That diet gave many of the inmates diarrhea and
abdominal typhus. Many of the prisoners died as the result
of undernourishment. One prisoner doctor at Monowitz
declared that "under normal conditions, ninety percent of
the entire prisoner strength at Monowitz would have to be
37sent to the hospital." An SS doctor in the Monowitz
hospital testified that
the turnover of inmates in Monowitz was very 
extensive. The inmates were weak and under­
nourished. In this connection one has to 
emphasize that the work performances required 
from the inmates was not in harmony with the 
food and living conditions.®®
Dennis Greenham, a British POW, recalled that the inmates
were obviously pushed far beyond their strength. "The
work would have been too heavy even for a well-nourished
39man; it was impossible for the inmates."
Because Greenham was a British POW, he received 
periodic parcels from the Red Cross. Without those 
parcels, an inmate would die within three months. Two 
inmates who served as male nurses calculated that the
36!bid., M-892/44/650-51, NI-9542, testimony of 
Otto Arabros.
37Ibid., M-892/44/1182, NI-12373, affidavit of 
Robert Waitz.
38Ibid., M-892/44/1089, NI-6190, affidavit of 
Friedrick Entress.
39Ibid., M-892/44/906, NI-11705, affidavit of 
Dennis Greenham.
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inmate diet provided 1100-1200 calories a day. Due to the
heavy work, the average inmate lost two to four kilograms
a day in body weight. An inmate could only make up this
40deficiency for three months before he starved to death.
An official of the personnel department of l.G. Auschwitz 
described an incident depicting the inmates' poor physical 
condition:
I was sitting in my office barracks, eating an 
apple. I opened the window to throw the core of 
the apple out of the window, and concentration 
camp inmates were cleaning the street in front of 
the barracks, . . .  and apparently because they 
were hungry, they pounced on this apple core and 
fought over it. ^
If an inmate became too sick to work, he checked
into the Monowitz hospital. Farben allowed no more than
5 percent of its Auschwitz inmates to be in the hospital
at one time. If that number was surpassed, the SS trans-
42ferred the excess inmates to Birkenau. The inmates had
a maximum sick leave of fourteen days paid by l.G. Farben.
If they still could not go back to work, they too were
^ 3
selected for Birkenau. The management of l.G. Auschwitz 
did not intend to treat the inmates with consideration.
40Ibid., M-892/44/982, NI-4830, affidavit of 
Rudolf Vitek.
41TWC, VIII, pp. 847-48, testimony of Helmut 
Schneider.
43Ibid., p. 577, affidavit of Arnost Tauber.
43U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/982, NI-4830, affidavit 
of Rudolf Vitek.
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They were used up so quickly that any physician was con­
fronted with an insoluble problem. The managers had no 
inten" on of enlarging the Monowitz hospital. The managers 
insisted on keeping it small because of the importance
they attached to having as many inmates as possible who
44were capable of work. A record book of the Monowitz 
hospital recovered after the war showed that 15,706 
inmates entered the hospital in an eleven-month period;
766 died there and 2,599 transferred out, with the 
notation "Nach Birkenau” or ”Nach Auschwitz."4^
When inmates went to work in l.G. Auschwitz, they 
usually worked at excavating, leveling, stacking cement, 
and storing sand. The work was very difficult for them 
in their weakened' conditions, but that was only a part of 
their problem. One Monowitz survivor said that the work 
was difficult "because of the great working speed, for 
instance the unloading of cement at the double, and 
secondly, because the Kapos under the pressure of the 
(l.G.) foremen drove us to work."4^ The most dreaded work 
detail was the cement detail, known as "murder detail 4."
In this duty the inmates had to carry sacks of cement,
44Ibid., M-892/44/1088, 1091, NI-6190, affidavit 
of Friedrick Entress.
45Ibid., M-892/45/1-2, NI-12116.
46Ibid., M-892/44/902, NI-7967, affidavit of 
Ervin Schulof.
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weighing fifty kilograms (about 110 pounds). The sacks 
were placed on the inmates' shoulders and carried 300 
meters while running. If an inmate was unable to move, or 
if he fell, he was stomped and kicked until he either con­
tinued to work or died.47
Another work detail was that of a spider-man who 
worked as high as 150 feet above the ground, without any 
scaffolding or safety belts. The inmates had to walk in 
their wooden shoes along girders which were only four 
inches wide. Many inmates fell to their death. Some 
inmates did not mind this detail because the guards would
not follow them up. For that brief moment, they were safe
, , 48from maltreatment.
The work system used at l.G. Auschwitz was called 
the "FFF system.” Farben designed the system to squeeze 
out bigger work performances from the inmates. "FFF” 
stood for Freiheit (freedom)— freedom of movement on the 
building sites with intensive safeguarding of the fences 
through chains of guards and the pretended possibility of 
a release; Fressen (food)— scanty extra food for high 
work performances; Frauen (women)— brothel visits as a
47Ibid., M-892/44/980, NI-4830, affidavit of 
Rudolf Vitek.
4®Krans and Kulka, Death Factory: Documents on
Auschwitz, p. 21.
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49special reward to the Kapos.
Beatings designed to raise work performances were
routine for the inmate laborers. Terrence Des Pres, in
The Survivor, wrote that the beatings and killings were
made easier because all visible signs of human beauty,
bodily pride, and spiritual radiance were eliminated from
the ranks of the inmates in the concentration camps. The
inmates looked sub-human. Their appearance made mass
murder seem less terrible to the SS."*^ At the Farben
trial at Nuremberg, Duerrfeld testified that he did not
consider the cruel treatment to be out of the ordinary—
the SS convinced him the inmates were made up exclusively
of criminal c o n v i c t s . ^  One inmate later claimed that he
had seen Duerrfeld observing the inmates when they marched
into Monowitz. He claimed that Duerrfeld could not help
but notice their state of health and the dilapidated
condition of their clothing.
On almost every occasion when we marched in, 
people who had fallen ill and those who had 
broken down during work, as well as people who 
had died, were carried into the camp on primi­
tive stretchers, so he must have become aware
49 Working Group of Former Prisoners, IG-Farben. 
Auschwitz, Mass Murder, p. 19.
^ T e r r e n c e  Des Pres, The Survivor: An Anatomy of
Life in the Death Camps (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1976), p. 61.
51TWC, VIII, p. 794, testimony of Walter Duerrfeld.
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5 2of the situation.
Dennis Greenham charged that the l.G. foremen had 
a fanatical hatred of the Jews and that they did not 
interfere when the Kapos beat them. Their attitude was 
not that of sympathy but rather that the Jews were untouch­
ables on whom they would not soil their hands. He also
noticed that all of the Farben foremen carried guns on the 
53plant site. Another inmate swore that he saw Max Faust
beat prisoners:
I personally saw how Chief Engineer Faust beat 
several prisoners with a club because the moving 
of loaded wagons in road construction did not 
function as he desired. I know that it was Chief 
Engineer Faust, because I inquired for his n a m e . ^
An inmate who worked at the Birkenau hospital reported
meeting several women who said that Farben officials had
cropped their hair short and broken their teeth for
punishment. She asked whether those acts of brutality were
committed by the SS or Kapos, and the women replied that
they were.done by civilians who worked for l.G. Farben.33
l.G. foremen supervised every stage of the work to
be sure a high standard of work was maintained. They made
33Ibid., p. 592, affidavit of Norbert Wollheim.
53U.S. v. Krauch. M-892/44/905-6, NI-11705, 
affidavit of Dennis Greenham.
3^TWC, VIII, p. 577, affidavit of Arnost Tauber.
55U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/1132-33, NI-10932,
affidavit of Olga Lengyel.
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a note of any deficiencies in the work and brought them to 
the attention of the SS. The foremen reported any inmate, 
foreign worker, or prisoner of war who was too slow or did 
not fit "into our d i s c i p l i n e . T h e  SS only recognized 
two categories of inmates— those who were capable of work 
and those who were dead.8^ When l.G. Farben complained 
that it was not getting the work contracted for, the SS 
selected the weaker-looking inmates and sent them to 
Birkenau. Once an SS labor officer was heard to say,
"Don’t send out prisoners like that. What would the l.G.
58say?" The SS made its selections every fourteen days, 
in the morning as the inmates were leaving Monowitz for 
work at the plant. A commission made up of the camp 
commandant, the camp leader,.the camp work leader, the 
camp physician, and always several civilians belonging to 
the l.G. Farben labor staff stood by the gate. Inmates
knew that if they were selected, it meant certain death at
59Birkenau. None of the Farben officials actually 
selected prisoners for the gas chambers, but their com­
■^See Krans and Kulka, Death Factory: Documents
on Auschwitz, p. 19; TWC, VIII, p. 544, NI-14549.
"^Krans and Kulka, Death Factory: Documents on
Auschwitz, p. 19.
58U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/1189, NI-12373, affi­
davit of Robert Waitz.
59Ibid., M-892/44/982, NI-4830, affidavit of
Rudolf Vitek.
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plaints of poor inmate work performances were indirectly 
responsible for the gassing of thousands of i n m a t e s . ^
At the Farben trial none of the defendants 
admitted that they knew of the gassings. Duerrfeld testi­
fied that he did not know what was going on at Auschwitz- 
Birkenau and never realized that an inmate who was unfit 
for work would be eliminated.^ Although the chimneys of 
the crematorium could be seen from l.G. Auschwitz, Krauch
testified that Duerrfeld had told him that the crematorium
62was there only to burn typhus victims. Former inmates
testified, however, that the odor of the burnt corpses could
be noticed in l.G. Auschwitz when the wind was favorable; it
was unavoidable for the management of l.G. Auschwitz not to
63know about the selections. . Hoess testified that the
stench of burning bodies could be smelled in the entire
Auschwitz area and that people living in the surrounding
64districts knew that people were being exterminated.
It was possible for the Farben plant management to 
save the lives of skilled workers who were headed for the
^In t e r v i e w  with John Mendelsohn, National 
Archives Historian, Washington, D.C., 14 November 1983.
^ S e e  U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/99/1040, testimony of 
Walter Duerrfeld; TWC, VIII, p. 801, testimony of Walter 
Duerrfeld.
62 Ibid., p. 667, testimony of Carl Krauch.
63U.S. v. Krauch. M-892/44/1094-95, NI-6190, 
affidavit of Friedrick Entress.
64 TMWC, XI, p. 360, testimony of Rudolph Hoess.
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gas chambers. A telephone call to the SS could often take 
names off the r o l l . ^  John Mendelsohn, an expert on the 
Nuremburg trials, reasoned that Buetefisch had to know 
about the gassings since he was a member of Himmler’s 
"Circle of F r i e n d s . I n  The Rise and Fall of the Third 
Reich, William Shirer concluded that the records leave no 
doubt that German businessmen like the l.G. Farben direc­
tors, who outwardly seemed to be the most decent of men
and pillars of their communities, had some involvement in
67the extermination process.
In late February 1944 the Auschwitz area came 
within range of Allied aircraft. Since the l.G. Farben 
factories were in the area, the Allies assumed that 
Auschwitz-Birkenau served primarily as a labor camp for 
Farben. When Allied reconnaissance flew over the area, 
it was the factories and not the concentration camps that 
became targets in the campaign to destory Germany's 
capacity to make war.
The first aerial reconnaissance plane flew over 
l.G. Auschwitz on April 4, 1944. Its photos showed that 
the area under development was 4,100 feet by 9,700 feet. 
The synthetic oil plant appeared to be in partial
65U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/1184, NI-12373, affi­
davit of Robert Waitz.
Interview, John Mendelsohn, 14 November 1983.
°^William Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third 
Reich (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), p. 1266.
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production, and Allied intelligence concluded that both the
synthetic oil plant and the synthetic rubber plant would
68soon be capable of large-scale production. Two more
reconnaissance flights over the plants on May 31 and June
26 confirmed this information. The urgency to bomb the
plants increased. On July 18, the Allies designated l.G.
69Auschwitz as a bombing target for the first time.
The first bombing raid took place on August 20, 
1944. The summary of the intelligence reports showed that 
most of the damage was done to the buna plant. The plant 
did not appear to be producing any rubber before the 
attack. The damage to the synthetic oil plant was mini­
mal. ̂  The inmates enjoyed the attack; one described 
their feelings:
The bombing was really a happy day for us. . . .
We thought, they know all about us, they are making 
preparations to free us, we might escape, some of 
us might get out, some of us might survive. . . .
We really enjoyed the bombing. . . .  We wanted 
once to see a killed German. Then we could sleep 
better, after the humiliation never to be able to 
answer back. To see a killed German: that was
why we enjoyed the b o m b i n g . ^
A second air raid which did considerable damage
^®Mendelsohn, ed., Holocaust, 14:95-96.
69 Gilbert, Auschwitz and the Allies, p. 282.
^ M e n d e l s o h n , ed., Holocaust. 14:99-100.
^ G i l b e r t ,  Auschwitz and the Allies, p. 308, 
interview with Arie Hassenberg.
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took place on September 13. That raid temporarily halted
72production at the synthetic oil plant. Besides bombing
l.G. Auschwitz, the Allies accidentally bombed the
Auschwitz main camp and Birkenau. Two bombs fell on the
main camp. One hit an SS barracks killing fifteen and
wounding twenty-eight. The other killed forty inmates,
wounded sixty-five, and buried thirteen under the ruins of
73a clothing workshop. Two bombs also hit Birkenau. One
damaged the railway track which led to the crematoria.
The other destroyed an air-raid shelter and killed thirty 
74civilians. An inmate later wrote of this air raid:
We had nothing to lose, only expected to enjoy 
the destruction of the big factory which we were 
building for l.G. Farben Industrie. It was 
naturally so. This happy feeling didn’t change 
also after the Americans indeed, began to bomb, 
and obviously we had casualties too— wounded and 
dead. How beautiful it was to see squadron after 
squadron burst from the sky, drop bombs, destroy 
the buildings, and kill also members of the 
Herrenvolk.' ̂
After the raids, I..G. Farben officials made no effort to 
recover the bodies of inmates trapped under the debris.
72 Krans and Kulka, Death Factory: Documents on
Auschwitz, p. 22.
73 /Bedwinska, ed., KL Auschwitz Seen by the SS: 
Hoss, Broad, Kremer, p. 257n.
^Gilbert, Auschwitz and the Allies, p. 315, letter 
from Shalom Lindenbaum.
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They would only clear debris to free trapped Germans.78
Farben had the synthetic oil plant rapaired by late
October 1944, although it operated at only two-thirds of
its earlier capacity of 3,000 tons a month. The amount
produced was the third highest in the Reich.77 Allied
bombers continued to attack l.G. Auschwitz, but they were
never again able to shut down oil production completely.
The bombardments gradually reduced production, however.
By December production fell to 1,200 tons a month; in the
first two weeks of January 1945 the production was 500 
78tons. A reconnaissance flight of January 14 showed
forty-four damaged buildings and 940 bomb craters in
Auschwitz III, although the synthetic oil plant was still 
79operating. The buna plant still did not produce any 
rubber, however.
By November 1944 the mass killings were almost 
over. As Soviet troops pushed westward, the SS trans­
ferred more and more inmates from Auschwitz to camps in 
Germany. On January 17, Soviet troops reached the town of 
Kattowitz. That same night, the rumble of artillery fire
76U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/907, NI-11705, affi­
davit of Dennis Greenham.
77Gilbert, Auschwitz and the Allies, p. 322.
78Ibid., p. 335.
79Ibid., p. 334.
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could be heard in Auschwitz. On January 18, the SS ordered 
the camp evacuated. Of the camp's 64,000 inmates, 58,000 
set out for Germany. The other 6,000, who were too weak 
to walk, remained in Auschwitz; 850 inmates remained in 
Monowitz. Eighty percent of the inmates who marched out
of Auschwitz were either shot, or died of cold, hunger,
80and sickness. One who survived the death march compared
Monowitz to his new home in Buchenwald:
Conditions in Buchenwald . . . were considerably 
more favorable than those of Monowitz: the food
was better. Moreover, the prisoners who had to 
work in the stone quarry performed with few 
exceptions, no heavy work, and finally they vere 
better clothed.®^-
One last bombing raid took place on l.G. Auschwitz
on January 19, 1945, leaving the 850 inmates in Monowitz
82without water or light. On the same day, Duerrfeld
received a phone call from the Reich Defense Commissioner
83with orders to evacuate l.G. Auschwitz. On January 20, 
the Farben plant managers burned their files and fled from 
Auschwitz. After the war, the U.S.S.R. dismantled the 
equipment of l.G. Auschwitz and sent it east to be used in
80Ibid., p. 349n.
81U.S. v. Krauch. M-892/44/1186, NI-12373, affi­
davit of Robert Waitz.
8 2Gilbert, Auschwitz and the Allies, pp. 335-37.
83U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/668, NI-4184, testimony 
of Walter Duerrfeld.
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Soviet industry.®^
The final balance sheet on l.G. Auschwitz reveals
that l.G. Farben invested nearly Sa 6GO million ($240
85million) in the operation. Otto Ambros testified that
l.G. Farben paid the SS Rm 20 million for the inmate
86laborers. By the summer of 1944 the synthetic oil plant
achieved a peak production of 3,000 tons a month— only
half of Farben's original projections. Allied air raids
gradually reduced this output. Not one single pound of .
87synthetic rubber was ever produced. Gustav Herzog, an
inmate whose responsibility it was to draw up the death
lists in Monowitz, estimated that 120,000 inmate deaths
88could be traced to l.G. Auschwitz and Monowitz. l.G. 
Auschwitz had to be one of the most dismal failures in the 
history of modern industry.
84 Hermann Gross, Further Facts and Figures Relating 
to the Deconcentration of the l.G. Farbenindustrie 
Aktiengesellschaft (Kiel: n.p., 1950), pp. 41-42.
^ T W C ,  VIII, p. 1017, Prosecution’s Final Brief.
^ U . S .  v. Krauch, M-892/44/649, NI-9542, testimony 
of Otto Ambros.
87 *See Dubois. *i>e’vi i? s Chemists, p. 341; Borkin,
Crime and Punishment of l.G. Farben, p. 127.
88Working Group of Former Prisoners, IG-Farben. 
Auschwitz, Mass Murder, pp. 22-23, NI-12069, affidavit of 
Gustav Herzog.
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CHAPTER IV
l.G. FARBEN AT NUREMBERG
As World War II ended, investigators in the U.S. 
Treasury and the Department of Justice pointed out to 
General Eisenhower that l.G. Farben, the dominant chemical 
cartel in Germany, suffered only slight damage during the 
war. They thought that if l.G. Farben remained intact 
after the war, it would pose a threat to the Allies. 
Eisenhower ordered an investigation into Farben's part in 
Germany's war effort. He assigned his financial advisor, 
Colonel Bernard Bernstein, to head the investigation of 
Farben's main office in Frankfurt.^"
The Farben files were so immense that it was easier 
for the investigators to interrogate the top leaders of 
the company. One by one, the investigators arrested and 
interrogated all the corporate directors in order to assess 
Farben's role in supporting the Hitler government:
Hermann Schmitz, Carl Krauch, Fritz ter Meer, Georg von 
Schnitzler, and others. While in custody, von Schnitzler, 
the man who pledged Rm 400,000 for Hitler's campaign in 
March 1933, testified at the International Military
^Richard Sasuly, l.G. Farben (New York: Boni and
Gaer, Inc., 1947), p. 11.
66
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Tribunal which tried the major war criminals.
The Bernstein investigating team concluded that 
l.G. Farben was indispensable to the German war effort.
Its report, especially on Farben’s cartel practices and 
its role in the takeover of the European chemical industry, 
made a deep impression on Eisenhower. He concluded that 
Farben had to be completely dissolved as one means of 
assuring world peace. He recommended that: 1) all Farben
plants and assets be made available for reparations; 2) all 
Farben plants used exclusively for war-making be destroyed; 
3) Farben’s chemical monopoly be dissolved; and 4) Farben's 
interest an international cartels be terminated. Immedi­
ately after this announcement, the Allies blew up three
Farben plants and- dismantled.five others for distribution 
2as reparations.
At the trial of the major war criminals, the 
prosecutors planned to indict a prominent German indus­
trialist as a symbol of those industrialists who cooperated 
with Hitler. They chose Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und 
Halbach to fill this role because he was the individual 
most associated by reputation with the war-making power of 
Germany. When the tribunal tried to serve the indictment 
upon Krupp, it discovered that he was mentally and physi­
cally unable to defend himself. On November 15, 1945, the
^New York Times, 21 October 1945, p. 1, col. 6.
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3tribunal decided that Krupp was too senile to be tried. 
When the chief prosecutors tried to substitute Krupp's son 
Alfred, the tribunal denied the motion. Thus the trial 
began without an industrialist as a defendant.
After the trial of the major war criminals, the 
chief prosecutors were determined to try leading German 
industrialists. They decided that a trial of industrial 
war criminals should be left to each of the Allies in its 
own zone of occupation. The United States proved to be 
the most energetic in that prosecution. American prose­
cutors brought charges against the leaders of three large 
companies: I.G. Farben and the steel concerns of Krupp
and Flick.
Those trials were part of a series of twelve con­
ducted by the United States to try "second-line" leaders 
of Hitler's Germany. On October 18, 1946, President 
Truman appointed Brigadier General Telford Taylor to 
succeed Justice Jackson as chief U.S. provost of the war 
crimes trials.^ Josiah Dubois, who served on the War 
Refugee Board during the war, became chief of the prose­
cution staff for the I.G. Farben case. Captain Drexel
3Great Britain, Office of the Attorney-General,
The Trial of German Major War Criminals. Proceedings of the 
International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, 
22:411.
^Whitney R. Harris, Tyranny on Trial: The Evidence
at Nuremberg, 2nd e d ., with an Introduction by Robert G. 
Storey (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press,
1970), p. 543.
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Sprecher, Taylor’s deputy, headed the I.G. Farben trial 
team."* A large part of the evidence used by the prosecu­
tion came from the Bernstein investigation.
The three judges selected to conduct the trial were 
Curtis Shake of Indiana, James Morris of North Dakota, and 
Paul Hebert of Louisiana. Clarence Merrill, who was also 
from Indiana, was the alternate member of the tribunal.
He would vote if one of the other members were forced to 
drop the case. Shake, who was chosen as the presiding 
judge, was a chief justice of the Indiana supreme court; 
Morris was a justice of the supreme court of North Dakota; 
Hebert was the dean of Louisiana State University's law 
school; and Merrill was an attorney recommended by Shake.^ 
The indictment against I.G. Farben, filed on May 
3, 1947, consisted of five separate counts:
Count I : Planning, Preparation, Initiation,
and Waging of Wars of Aggression 
and Invasions of Other Countries
Plunder and Spoliation
Slavery and Mass Murder




"United States of America v. Carl Krauch et al.," 
14 August 1947 - 30 July 1948, Records of the United States 
Nuernberg War Crimes Trials, Record Group 238, National 
Archives, Washington, D.C., Microfilm Publication M-892, 
roll 1, frame 36 (hereafter cited as U.S. v. Krauch, 
M-892/1/36).
^See Ibid.; Josiah Dubois, The Devil’s Chemists 
(Boston: The Beacon Press, 1952), pp. 66, 82, 93-94.
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Count V ; Common Plan or Conspiracy.^
Counts I and V, the aggressive war counts, accused Farben 
of an alliance with Hitler that started in 1932 when Carl 
Bosch first sought support for his synthetic oil project. 
The aggressive war counts also accused Farben of focusing 
all its activities on Germany's preparations for war. The 
plunder and spoilation charge accused Farben of following 
the Wehrmacht into a captured country in order to take 
over its chemical industry. Count III, slavery and mass 
murder, accused Farben of participating in the forced 
labor program and the enslavement of concentration camp 
inmates which led to torture and murder. The prosecution 
charged that the Farben directors knew of the atrocities, 
including the use of the Zyclon-B gas and experiments with 
Farben products on concentration camp inmates. Count IV, 
membership in the SS, charged certain Farben officials 
with membership in that organization which the Interna­
tional Military Tribunal had declared as a criminal 
8group.
The prosecution indicted a total of twenty-four of 
Farben's top executives on Counts I, II, III, and V: the
United States Military Tribunal, Trials of War 
Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals: October
1946-August 1949. 15 vols. (Washington, D.C.: United
States Government Printing Office, 1952), vol. VII: The
I.G. Farben Case, pp. 10-11 (hereafter cited as TWC).
®Ibid., p p . 10-80.
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twenty members of the Vorstand and four other top offi- 
9cials. The prosecution charged Heinrich Buetefisch, 
Christian Schneider, and Erich von der Heyde with member­
ship in the SS.
The trial began on August 27, 1947. From the 
beginning, the prosecution encountered many problems. By 
the summer of 1947 the Cold War between the United States 
and the Soviet Union had started. Because of their 
growing fear of communism, many Americans were prepared 
to ignore past German crimes. Before he left Washington 
for Nureraburg, Dubois overheard three men discussing the 
growing tensions which had developed:
They agreed vociferously and bitterly that the 
last war had been unnecessary, whereas the next 
was inevitable. We had fought the wrong enemies, 
apparently by our own choice and without a single 
righteous reason. But the next war would have an 
honest moral b a s i s .
The Cold War led to the questioning of the legality of the
Nuremberg trials. By the time the Farben trial started,
Congressman John Rankin of Mississippi was calling the
9The twenty members of the Vorstand were: Carl
Krauch, Hermann Schmitz, Baron Georg von Schnitzler, Fritz 
ter Meer, Otto Ambros, Heinrich Buetefisch, Wilhelm Mann, 
Max Brueggemann, Heinrich Hoerlein, Carl Wurster,
Christian Schneider, Fritz Gajewski, Max Ilgner, Paul 
Haefliger, Ernst Buergin, Friedrich Jaehne, Heinrich Oster, 
August von Knieriem, Hans Kuehne, and Carl Lautenschlaeger; 
the four other top officials were Walter Duerrfeld,
Heinrich Gattineau, Hans Kugler, and Erich von der Heyde. 
See Appendix A for the position each defendant held in I.G. 
Farben.
"^Dubois, Devil’s Chemists, p. 18.
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trials a disgrace to the United S t a t e s . C o n g r e s s m a n
George Dondero of Michigan accused Dubois of being a com-
12munist sympathizer. August von Knieriem claimed that the
prosecution held the advantage before any of the trials
began. He pointed out the problems that many of the
13defense lawyers had in obtaining documents.
In November 1947 Judge Francis Biddle, who served 
on the International Military Tribunal, defended the trial 
against the major war criminals as a fair trial. The 
tribunal, he wrote, had no desire to imitate Nazi methods 
because the burden of proof was on the prosecution. The 
defendants grew to realize that the rulings of the tribunal 
were objective. The Nuremberg trials, he alleged, were not
regarded as an opportunity for propaganda by the four
. „ . 14victorious powers.
John Mendelsohn agreed that the defense had pro­
blems in procuring documents in some of the trials, but 
contended that in the I.G. Farben case the defense was 
quite effective in procuring the documents it wanted. He
■^Joseph Borkin, The Crime and Punishment of I.G. 
Farben (New York: The Free Press, 1978), p. 139.
12 Dubois, Devil’s Chemists, p. 69.
13 August von Knieriem, The Nuremberg Trials 
(Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1959), p. 184.
■^Francis Biddle, "The Nurnberg Trial," Virginia 
Law Review 33 (November 1947): 680-81.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7 3
maintained that Judge Shake interpreted the document
handling procedures liberally enough to give the defense
the advantage.^
At a luncheon on the first day of the trial, Judge
Morris commented to Dubois, "We have to worry about the
Russians now; it wouldn’t surprise me if they overran the
courtroom before we get through.”^  During the course of
the trial, he allowed his wife to dine with von Schnitzler’s
wife. She thought it was an honor to be befriended by a
real baroness . ^  Judge Shake went to Germany armed with
the conviction that the trial of German industrialists on
18aggressive war charges was a mistake. He was very 
friendly towards the defense attorneys throughout the 
trial. Once he had the brilliant idea of inviting the 
Farben attorneys to dinner at the Grand Hotel where
19Germans were generally denied the right of admittance.
The aggressive war charges constituted the heart 
of any case at Nuremberg. In the early postwar years the
John Mendelsohn, ’’Trial by Document: The Problem
of Due Process for War Criminals at Nuernberg,” Journal of 
the National Archives 7 (Winter 1975): 232-34.
"^Dubois, Devil’s Chemists, p. 95.
^ J o h n  Alan Appleman, Military Tribunals and 
International Crimes (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1971),
p. 180n.
18 Dubois, Devil’s Chemists, p. 347.
19 Appleman, Military Tribunals, p. 180n.
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Allies had not fully realized the extent of the Holocaust.
Most of the printed material on the extermination process
was published after the completion of the Nuremburg
trials. The prosecution in the Farben trial relied upon
the judgment of the International Military Tribunal which
had declared that the crime against peace was the supreme
international crime, differing only from other war crimes
because it contained within itself the accumulated evil of
all the crimes. Anything else, however dramatic, however
sordid, however shocking and revolting to the feelings of
civilized peoples, was subordinate to the supreme crime 
20against peace. Besides contending with the effects of 
the Cold War, the Farben trial team tried to prove that 
the defendants contributed to the cause of war. They knew 
it was a difficult task to blame a war on men who did not 
pull any triggers. Years later they realized that they had 
made a mistake. It was under those circumstances that the 
prosecution set out to prove its case against I.G. Farben.
Taylor's opening statement set the tone of the
prosecution's case:
The indictment accuses these men of major responsi­
bility for visiting upon mankind the most searing 
and catastrophic war in human history. It accuses 
them of wholesale enslavement, plunder, and murder. 
These are terrible charges; no man should under­
write them frivolously or vengefully, or without
9  0 Franz B. Schick, "Crimes Against Peace," Journal 
of Criminal Law and Criminology 38 (January-February 1948): 
446-47.
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deep and humble awareness of the responsibility 
which he thereby shoulders.
The prosecution approached the aggressive war charges as if
it were trying antitrust violators instead of war criminals.
It presented the tribunal with organizational charts,
cartel agreements, patent licenses, correspondence, produc-
22tion schedules, and corporate reports.
After nearly three months of listening to the anti­
trust strategy, Morris became irritated that the case had 
become bogged down by a lot of irrelevant evidence. The 
trial was slowed down by the presentation of a mass of 
contracts which appeared to have little bearing on the 
case. To Morris, I.G. Farben was simply a big chemical,
commercial, and business concern, similar to many through- 
23 'out the world.
Judges Hebert and Merrill accused Morris of 
prejudice against the prosecution. Hebert said the prose­
cution would not be doing its duty if it overlooked any 
evidence which it considered important. Merrill agreed 
that it was better to submit too much evidence rather than 
keep something out which might have some bearing on the 
case. Shake sided with Morris when he asserted that Hebert 
and Merrill were too sympathetic towards the prosecution.
21TWC, VII, p. 99.
22 Borkin, Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben,
p. 141.
^ D u b o i s ,  Devil's Chemists, p. 82.
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He told the prosecution to organize the case better.
Dubois observed that the court was split down the middle.
The big problem the prosecution had was Merrill's opinion
24meant nothing to the final judgment.
Emanuel Minskoff, a member of the prosecution staff,
took note of Shake's request for better organization. He
told Dubois the prosecution should start discussing
Farben's role at Auschwitz. He agreed that the evidence on
the aggressive war charge was fine, but the court just
could not believe that the Farben directors were guilty of
starting a war. Dubois warned Minskoff that this statement
was prejudgmental. Minskoff replied:
Of course it is. But I still say you should argue 
Auschwitz; then they will see what kind of men they 
are trying, and they’ll understand all the rest of 
it. We should have started with Auschwitz on the 
first d a y . 25
He said they should introduce Duerrfeld, then show how he 
reported to Ambros, who then reported to ter Meer and the 
rest of the Vorstand♦ Dubois liked Minskoff's idea but 
claimed that it was too late to adopt his recommendation.
The trial had to continue according to the sequence of the 
counts of the indictment. Drexel Sprecher later agreed 
that the prosecution had made the mistake of not arguing
24Ibid., pp. 94-96.
25Ibid., p. 99.
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2 6I.G. Auschwitz enough.
The prosecution continued to argue the aggressive
war charge. It submitted into evidence Gattineau*s and
Buetefisch's first meeting with Hitler to discuss his
support for Farben’s synthetic oil project in November
1932, Farben’s support for Hitler in the meeting of the
industrialists in February 1933, the synthetic oil and
rubber contracts made between Farben and the Reich,
Farben's army liaison office in Berlin, and Farben’s part
in the Four-Year Plan.
Georg von Schnitzler's pre-trial testimony was a
very important part of the prosecution’s case in the
aggressive war charges. It used his testimony to show that
the whole Vorstand, through these activities, knew that war
must come. Dubois later wrote, ’’Yes, the directors of I.G.
Farbenindustrie owned the power to make a war. . . . Only
Farben could have done it, and without Farben war was, in
27von Schnitzler’s word, ’unthinkable.'" The tribunal 
damaged the prosecution's case when it ruled that von 
Schnitzler's statements proved nothing about the common 
intentions of the defendants.
During the trial, the events of Nuremberg took a
2 6Interview with Drexel Sprecher, Former Head of 
Farben Trial Team at Nuremberg, Bethesda, Maryland, 24 
August 1983.
9 7 Dubois, Devil's Chemists, p. 336.
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back seat to the events of the Cold War. As East-West
tension grew, Nuremberg became more untimely, and editors
relegated it to the back pages of the newspapers. The
trials against German industrialists seemed inappropriate
when the differences among the Allies were increasing. As
the crimes of the Nazis became more remote, a strong
28rearmed Germany became desirable. On February 25, 1948,
the communists secured President Eduard Benes' agreement
to a predominantly communist government in Czechoslovakia.
Events like that led Dubois to conclude later that the
fear of communism influenced the Farben trial just as it
29influenced American foreign policy.
At the time of the communist coup in Prague, the 
prosecution received another setback in a dispute over 
access to certain documents. The prosecution learned that 
Farben had transferred a large number of documents from 
the company library near Frankfurt to its Ludwigshafen 
plant in the French zone of occupation. The prosecution 
believed that those documents were part of the missing 
records of I.G. Auschwitz. The Ludwigshafen plant manage­
ment claimed that the documents were important to the 
operation of the plant. The prosecution sent a team of 
investigators to Ludwigshafen. They searched the plant and
^ M e n d e l s o h n , "Trial by Document," p. 230.
29 Dubois, Devil's Chemists, p. 357.
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the home of Wolfgang Alt, who had served the dual role of 
technical advisor to the Ludwigshafen plant management and 
associate defense counsel for Otto Ambros. Although they 
obtained some records from the search of Alt’s house, they 
entered without a warrant. That was a big mistake because 
Alt, as an associate defense counsel, was under the protec­
tion of the court. Shake reprimanded Alt for mixing the 
records of the defense with his personal papers, but he 
did not allow the prosecution access to these documents,
and reprimanded the prosecution for taking matters into its
u  ̂ 30own hands.
After the prosecution completed its case for 
aggressive war, it introduced evidence on the plunder and 
spoilation charge. It showed how Farben had used the fear 
of Nazi takeover to acquire chemical plants throughout 
Europe. It emphasized the role of the defendants in the 
Sales and Technical Committees: von Schnitzler, ter Meer,
Max Ilgner, Friedrich Jaehne, Heinrich Oster, Paul 
Haefliger, Ernst Buergin, and Hans Kugler.
The prosecution next proceeded to Count III, 
slavery and mass murder. That charge included Farben’s 
use of forced labor throughout its plants in Germany, but 
the heart of the indictment was the activities of I.G. 
Auschwitz. The prosecution presented a history of I.G.
30 See Appleman, Military Tribunals, p. 179n; 
Mendelsohn, "Trial by Document," pp. 232-33.
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Farben's involvement at Auschwitz: the choice of the site,
negotiations with the SS for inmate labor, and treatment
of the inmates at the plant site and at Monowitz. The
prosecution introduced evidence which showed how the whole
Vorstand approved the choice of the Auschwitz site and
appropriated money to build Monowitz. Ambros testified
that the management of I.G. Auschwitz had complete control
31over the allocation of inmates. The prosecutors showed
how Farben had built a fence around the perimeter of the
plant to keep out the SS so that the Farben managers could
32dictate the work pace of the inmates to the Kapos. The
prosecution concluded that Farben's conduct at Auschwitz
was best described by a remark once made by Hitler, "What
33does it matter to.us? Look away if it makes you sick."
The basic strategy of the Farben defense was to 
show that: 1) Farben was a private enterprise which
pursued a long-term policy of peaceful investment; 2) none 
of the defendants had knowledge of what was going on at 
Auschwitz-Birkenau; 3) Farben was in a state of coercion 
during the Nazi period; and 4) the directors feared the 
expansion of communism when they supported Hitler. Krauch
3 ^TWC, VIII, p. 753, testimony of Otto Ambros.
33See Dubois, Devil's Chemists, pp. 166-67; U.S. 
v. Krauch, M-892/44/646, Nuremberg Industrialists (NI) 
9542, testimony of Otto Ambros.
33TWC, VII, p. 58.
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testified that all the executives of I G. Farben put the 
greatest emphasis on peacetime production. The company 
tried to keep its distance from the Nazis; it only capit­
ulated on the order of the military high command. He said 
the military high command misunderstood his motives when 
he expanded buna production. Krauch maintained that 
Farben recognized buna rubber as a far superior product for 
shoe soles than leather. He wanted to expand production in 
order to provide German consumers with a superior type of 
footwear.^
Part of Farben’s strategy was to blame everything 
that happened at I.G. Auschwitz on the SS. All the 
defense attorneys in the trials of second-line Nazi
35leaders had great'success with this type of strategy.
Ter Meer, who visited I.G. Auschwitz and Monowitz twice, 
testified that he was not aware that the camp which housed 
the inmates was called Monowitz. He said he heard this 
name for the first time at the trial. He did not recall 
seeing any guard towers at the camp and noticed nothing 
special in regard to the physical condition and attire of 
the inmates. Duerrfeld testified that he did not have 
any jurisdiction at I.G. Auschwitz. The SS had total
^ New York Times, 13 January 1948, p. 10, col. 4.
o SInterview, Drexel Sprecher, 24 August 1983.
o C.
Dubois, Devil’s Chemists, p. 157.
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responsibility. He did not know what went on at Auschwitz-
Birkenau, and he feigned surprise when he heard that
inmates transferred to Birkenau went directly to the gas 
37chambers. Buetefisch summed up the position of the
Farben defendants when he said, "We are only technical 
38men." Friedrich Jaehne, a member of the Technical Com­
mittee, visited I.G. Auschwitz twice. He claimed that he 
had noticed no mistreatment of the inmates. His son 
Norbert, who served as an engineer at I.G. Auschwitz, 
called his father a liar. He asserted that there was a
direct relationship between the requirements set by Farben
39and the ill-treatment of the inmates.
The first two defense tactics met with mixed 
success. The defense had more success when it claimed 
that regulations were so stringent under Hitler's dictator­
ship that private individuals, including leading indus­
trialists, could not refuse their cooperation without fear 
of immediate penalty, including imprisonment and possibly
even death. That claim was called "the defense of
. „ ,,40necessity.
^7U.S. v. Krauch. M-892/99/1039-41, testimony of 
Walter Duerrfeld.
^®TWC, VIII, p. 777, testimony of Heinrich Buete­
fisch.
O Q Dubois, Devil s Chemists, p. 219.
*°TWC, VII, pp. 414-15.
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The Farben lawyers brought in Field Marshal Erhard
Milch and Friedrich Flick, the head of the Flick concern,
as defense witnesses. When asked what would happen to a
German businessman if he refused to employ concentration
camp prisoners and prisoners of war, Milch replied:
He would have been put under arrest immediately 
and he would have faced the Peoples' Court for 
undermining the fighting spirit. . . . It 
normally led to the death sentence.
The defense asked Flick what would happen to a prominent 
industrialist who refused to attend the February 1933 
meeting which Goering called to raise election funds for 
Hitler. Flick said, "He could do that, if he did not con­
sider the consequences, but naturally he would have 
42regretted it. The defendants used the defense of
necessity when they contended that the government forced
4 3them to build the fourth buna plant at Auschwitz.
John Mendelsohn argued that the government did not force
I.G. Farben to build the plant at Auschwitz. Farben had
f 44enough power to refuse the government s request.
The International Military Tribunal had rejected
coercion as an excuse for war crimes. Authors of criminal
^ I b i d . ,  p. 416. ^ I b i d . ,  p. 417.
43See U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/98/197, testimony of 
Fritz ter Meer; Ibid., M-892/99/548-51, testimony of Otto 
Ambros; Ibid., M-892/99/1076, testimony of Walter 
Duerrfeld.
^Interview, John Mendelsohn, 14 November 1983.
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acts had not been allowed to shelter themselves behind
45their official positions. But the tribunal in the I.G.
Farben case allowed the defense of necessity. It ruled
that the directors had no choice but to comply with the
mandates of the Hitler government:
There can be little doubt that the defiant refusal 
of a Farben executive to carry out the Reich pro­
duction schedule or to use slave labor to achieve 
that end would have been treated as treasonous
sabotage and would have resulted in prompt and
drastic retaliation.^
The defense also had success when it worked on the 
prevailing atmosphere of the Cold War. Schmitz told the 
tribunal that Farben sympathized with Hitler's fear of 
communism; his continual warnings that Germany had to be
47prepared to defend itself against the Bolshevist danger.
When Krauch's defense counsel made his closing statements,
he said that Hitler's speeches on foreign policy made a
deep impression on his client:
Through them all, like a red thread, runs the 
profession of love of peace and preparedness for 
peace, and from 1936 on, the Bolshevist danger 
is represented as the thing against which a dam 
must be erected. How right Hitler was in this 
outline of his policy, by the way, might be
See Biddle, "The Nurnberg Trial," pp. 688-89;
Sir Norman Birkett, "International Legal Theories Evolved 
at Nuremberg," International Affairs 23 (July 1947): 317-18.
^ T W C ,  VIII, pp. 1174-75, Opinion and Judgment.
^ D u b o i s ,  Devil's Chemists, p. 338.
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confirmed by the political situation which had 
developed in recent months in Europe. °
After 152 trial days, the proceedings ended on
May 12, 1948. Two months elapsed before the tribunal
reconvened to read its judgment. During that time, two
events magnified the importance of the statements made by 
the defense on the expansion of communism. In mid-June 
Benes resigned as president of Czechoslovakia; Element 
Gottwald, a communist, succeeded him as president, thus 
completing the communist takeover of Czechoslovakia. In 
July the Berlin blockade began.
On July 29, the tribunal convened to read its
opinion and render its verdict. The court acquitted all
the defendants on Counts I and V, the planning and waging
of aggressive war. It relied on the judgment of the
International Military Tribunal when it said that the
Farben defendants were not planners and leaders like
Goering, Hess, Rosenberg, and Keitel, who were found guilty
of waging aggressive war. The defendants were followers
like Speer who aided the war effort in the same way that
other productive enterprises aid in the waging of war:
The defendants now before us were neither high 
public officials in the civil government nor high 
military officers. Their participation was that 
of followers and not leaders. If we lower the 
standard of participation to include them, it is 
difficult to find a logical place to draw the line
^®TWC, VIII, p. 914, closing statement for 
Defendant Krauch.
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between the guilty and the innocent among the 
great mass of German people. "
The court then set the guidelines for the guilt or 
innocence of Count II, plunder and spoliation. A defendant 
was guilty when he deprived an owner of his property 
involuntarily and against his will; and when his consent 
was obtained by threats, intimidation, pressure, or by 
exploiting the position and power of the military occupant 
under circumstances indicating that the owner was being 
induced to part with his property against his w i l l . ^  The 
tribunal found nine of the defendants guilty for their 
part in Farben’s takeover of the European chemical industry; 
Hermann Schmitz, as head of the Vorstand: Georg von 
Schnitzler, as head of the Sales Committee; Fritz ter Meer, 
for his role in the acquisition of the Polish plants and 
Francolor; Hans Kugler, for his role in Francolor;
Friedrich Jaehne, for his role in Alsace-Lorraine; and 
Ernst Buergin, Paul Haefliger, Max Ilgner, and Heinrich 
Oster, for their roles in N o r w a y . ^
In Count III, slave labor and mass murder, the 
tribunal addressed Farben’s participation in the forced 
labor program, the production of the Zyclon-B gas, medical 
experiments made on inmates with Farben products, and 
Farben's participation at Auschwitz. The tribunal allowed
Ibid., p. 1126, Opinion and Judgment.
50Ibid., pp. 1134-36. 51Ibid., pp. 1153-67.
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the defense of necessity and acquitted the Farben defen­
dants of participation in the forced labor program:
During the course of the war the main Farben 
plants, in common with German industry generally, 
suffered a serious labor depletion, on the account 
of demands of the military for men to serve in the 
armed forces. Charged with the responsibility of 
meeting fixed production quotas, Farben yielded to 
the pressure of the Reich Labor Office and utilized 
involuntary foreign workers in many of its p l a n t s . ^ 2
The prosecution had charged Farben with participation in
the production of the Zyclon-B gas because it owned 42.5
percent of Degesch and four of the defendants sat on its
administrative council: Mann, Hoerlein, Wurster, and
Brueggemann. The tribunal decided that the evidence failed
to show that any of the defendants had any persuasive
influence on the management policies of the company or any
significant knowledge of the uses of the product. Dr.
Gerhard Peters, the managing director of Degesch, was sworn
to secrecy under the penalty of death as to the use of the
Zyclon-B gas. Therefore, all the defendants were acquitted 
53on this charge. The prosecution had charged that Farben 
manufactured deadly pharmaceuticals and supplied them to 
the SS for experimentation on concentration camp inmates. 
The tribunal concluded that the evidence showed that while 
Farben did supply the SS with experimental drugs, it dis­
continued forwarding them as soon as they suspected 
improper conduct. All of the defendants were acquitted on
52Ibid., pp. 1173-74. 53Ibid., pp. 1168-69.
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this charge because the evidence fell short of establishing
54guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The tribunal then turned to Farben's participation 
at Auschwitz. Even though the whole Vorstand had approved 
the Auschwitz site for the plants, the tribunal ruled that 
the prosecution had not proved that the possible employ­
ment of concentration camp inmates was an important factor 
when the directors made their decision. The court acknowl­
edged that the construction of Monowitz went beyond the 
necessity created by the pressure of government, but it 
was an improvement over Auschwitz. The court commended 
the defendants for supplying, at company expense, the noon­
time "Buna Soup" to the inmates. The tribunal blamed the 
SS for the mistreatment of the workers: "It is clear that
Farben did not deliberately pursue or encourage an 
inhumane policy with respect to the w o r k e r s . T h e  court 
did hold Krauch, ter Meer, Ambros, Buetefisch, and 
Duerrfeld accountable for their initiative in procuring 
concentration camp and forced labor for I.G. Auschwitz.
The tribunal concluded that their actions constituted a 
crime against humanity because those defendants procured 
labor
with knowledge of the abuse and inhumane treatment 
meted out to the inmates by the SS, and that the 
employment of these inmates on the Auschwitz site
54Ibid., pp. 1169-72. 55Ibid., p. 1185.
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aggravated the misery of these unfortunates and 
contributed to their distress.
The tribunal dismissed the charges against 
Schneider, Buetefisch, and von der Heyde for membership in 
the SS. It ruled that they were only honorary members who 
did not have knowledge of war crimes or crimes against 
humanity. “*7
After the tribunal delivered its judgment, Hebert 
announced that he agreed with the acquittal of the defen­
dants on Counts I and V, but dissented on the judgment in 
Count III. He would sign the judgment, he said, but 
reserved the right to file a dissenting opinion. In 
December 1948 he wrote that the whole Vorstand was guilty 
of using forced labor and should have been held account­
able for the living and working conditions at I.G.
58Auschwitz and Monowitz.
After the members of the tribunal had signed the 
judgment, Shake imposed the sentences. The tribunal found 
thirteen of the twenty-four defendants guilty on at least 
one of the charges. The sentences ranged from one and 
one-half years to eight years. The tribunal imposed the 
heaviest sentences on the five defendants who dealt 
directly with I.G. Auschwitz. The tribunal gave the
56Ibid. , p. 1187. 5?Ibid., pp. 1196-97.
58Ibid., pp. 1312-13, 1320, Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Hebert.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9 0
defendants credit for the time they spent in custody. For 
that reason, it released Max Ilgner and Hans Kugler after
it adjourned. The rest were to serve the balance of their
59sentences.
Not all of the Farben defendants served the balance 
of their sentences, however. In 1950 in an effort to start 
a new relationship between the United States and Germany, 
Washington called for the creation of a new German army of 
500,000 men. A large number of former German officers 
responded with an all-out campaign for the immediate 
release of all war criminals, asserting that without it 
there would be no army. The movement enjoyed wide public 
support. American diplomats, in an effort to appease the 
movement, released a large number of convicted war 
criminals, including Krauch, ter Meer, Ambros, Buetefisch, 
and Duerrfeld. Released by January 1951 none, therefore,
served more than two and one-half years of his remaining
60sentences.
After the trial Dubois observed that "the sen­
tences were light enough to please a chicken thief, or a
59 See Appendix B for a complete list of the sen­
tences imposed and the time left to serve.
^ S e e  Benjamin B. Ferencz, Less Than Slaves:
Jewish Forced Labor and the Quest for Compensation 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979),
p. 32; T. H. Tetens, The New Germany and the Old Nazis 
(New York: Random House, 1961), pp. 99-100.
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driver who had irresponsibly run down a pedestrian.
John Appleman wrote in Military Tribunals and International 
Crimes that the prosecution proved that the Farben direc­
tors had worked closely with Hitler in Germany’s prepara­
tions for war, but that the tribunal seemed less concerned
with the leading business figures than with the persons
62actually carrying out orders. Quincy Wright, in his 
1949 article ’’International Law and Guilt by Association,” 
defended the tribunal’s leniency by arguing that a 
defendant's guilt had to be personal, not by association.
No matter how bad his character, the accused must be 
considered innocent unless his guilt is established by 
evidence that he committed, attempted, or intended the 
crime charged. Louis Lochner wrote that many of the 
industrialists who supported Hitler were fervent national­
ists and patriots. They were good Germans who believed in 
the creed: ”My country right or w r o n g . " ^  The tribunal's
judgment reflected the tide of events. Though the 
sentences handed out seemed to be inappropriate, the 
Farben trial took place during a time when the western
^ D ubois, Devil's Chemists, p. 339.
^Appleman, Military Tribunals, pp. 179-80, 183.
Quincy Wright, "International Law and Guilt by 
Association," American Journal of International Law 43 
(October 1949): 747.
^ L o u i s  P. Lochner, Tycoons and Tyrants: German
Industry from Hitler to Adenauer (Chicago: Henry Regnery
Co., 1954), p. 33.
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democracies engaged in a new confrontation with their 
former ally. Their strategic position would be strength­
ened when the political and economic restoration of 
western Germany was ach i e v e d . ^
The Nuremberg trials did not stress the rights of 
the former concentration camp inmates. It was natural that 
some of them began to wonder about their legal rights. One 
of the inmates who testified at the Farben trial, Norbert 
Wollheim, was as surprised as the prosecution at the 
mildness of the court’s verdict. He decided to make I.G. 
Farben pay for what it did to him. He hired a lawyer and 
sued for Dm 10,000 (less than $2,500). The Frankfurt 
court that heard the case ruled in favor of Wollheim.
The newspaper stories of his success encouraged other 
survivors to seek compensation. The courts awarded 5,855 
former inmates a total of Dm 27,841,500 in d a m a g e s . ^  
Because of the antimonopolistic ideals of the 
United States, the break-up of I.G. Farben became a prime 
objective of U.S. occupation policy after World War II.
In late February 1947 the American Military Government 
passed an antitrust law designed to prevent monopoly 
practices in Germany. The military government said it
^ C a r l  Boyd, "Industrials and Total War: Records
of the U.S. Nuremberg War Crimes Trials," Microfilm 
Review 7 (November-December 1978): 330.
^Ferencz, Less Than Slaves, pp. 35-37, 210.
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would investigate any firm which employed more than 10,000
people. If the firm was found to represent an excessive
concentration of economic power, it would be reorganized
and broken up into a number of units. This law served as
the legal vehicle for the dissolution of Farben and led to
the division of the cartel into forty-seven independent
companies. German trustees ran each unit until I.G.
Farben could be formally decentralized. The break-up
stalled because of the Cold War. The western democracies
considered the disintegration of I.G. Farben to be an
impediment to the economic recovery of Germany. The
American Military Government took no further action until
the Farben trial ended . ^
The judgment which acquitted the Farben directors
of crimes against peace meant that Farben would no longer
be dealt with as a war criminal. I.G. Farben became
subject only to decartelization laws intended to create
6 8competition in the German chemical industry. The Farben 
stockholders, who realized that I.G. Farben must adapt to 
the antimonopolistic practices of the United States,
6 7Borkin, Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben. 
pp. 158-59.
£ Q
See Hermann Gross, Facts and Figures Relating 
to the Disintegration of the I.G. Farbenindustrie 
Aktiengesellschaft (Kiel: n.p., 1949), p. 2; Hermann
Gross, Further Facts and Figures Relating to the Deconcen­
tration of the I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft 
(Kiel: n.p., 1950), p. 45.
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proposed that the plants in western Germany be restructured
into three companies: Hoechst, Bayer, and BASF. There
would be one company for each zone of occupation: Hoechst
in the U.S. zone, Bayer in the British zone, and BASF in
the French zone. The stockholders realized that assets in
69the hands of the Soviet Union were lost. On March 18, 
1953, the Allied High Commission officially divided I.G. 
Farben into the three new companies.
Today the three companies are among the largest in 
the world. In 1982 Hoechst ranked forty-second, Bayer 
forty-third, and BASF forty-eighth. The companies had a 
combined net sales of over $40 billion, which ranked the 
I.G. Farben survivors among the ten largest industrial 
corporations in the world.
^ New York Times, 20 December 1949, p. 19, col. 1.
70Ibid., 19 March 1953, p. 5, col. 2.
7^"The World's Largest Industrial Corporations," 
Fortune, August 22, 1983, pp. 170-71.
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CONCLUSIONS
Prior to this study, I.G. Farben's place in histo­
riography was that of a large company that helped Hitler 
make World War II possible. To the historians who 
previously wrote about Farben, the company's role in plan­
ning and waging aggressive war constituted its greatest 
crime, while the use of concentration camp labor seemed of 
lesser importance. From the perspective of nearly four 
decades of an international arms race, it is more diffi­
cult to condemn industrialists who contribute to national 
defense and prepare for possible war. Correspondingly, 
violations of human rights have come to seem more important. 
By focusing on I.G. Farben's role in constructing and 
operating I.G. Auschwitz, this study has reassessed the 
responsibility of the Farben directors for their part in 
Nazi crimes against humanity.
From the beginning, Farben leaders were deeply 
involved in decisions regarding the use of slave labor.
A decisive factor in the Vorstand * s approval of the plant 
location was the SS plan to expand the Auschwitz concen­
tration camp, thus providing Farben an inexhaustible 
supply of cheap labor. When construction began, the plant 
management adopted SS labor practices and dictated the
95
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inmates' working speed to the Kapos. Although the I.G. 
Auschwitz management did not directly select prisoners for 
gassing, their complaints of poor inmate work performance 
resulted in the transfer of thousands of inmates to 
Birkenau. By the end of World War II, 120,000 inmate 
deaths could be traced to I.G. Auschwitz.
In the Farben trial the attempt to assess the 
responsibility of the Farben leadership was flawed from 
the start. The prosecution considered the aggressive war 
charge to be the supreme international crime and the most 
important part of its case. It tried to prove that the 
defendants were guilty of helping Hitler start World War 
II, but it was not able to convince the tribunal that men 
who did not pull any triggers were guilty of starting a 
war. The prosecution did not understand the enormity of 
the crimes against humanity and looked upon the Holocaust 
as a result of the war. Years later one of the prose­
cutors, Drexel Sprecher, realized that the prosecution had 
been mistaken in not attaching sufficient significance to 
the crimes committed at I.G. Auschwitz.*
The trial was also conducted by judges who were 
less than impartial. Even before the trial began, two of 
the judges, Shake and Morris, were convinced of the 
defendants' innocence. They saw I.G. Farben as part of a
Interview with Drexel Sprecher, Former Head of 
Farben Trial Team at Nuremberg, Bethesda, Maryland,
24 August 1983.
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rebuilt Germany which would help prevent the spread of
communism. Events like the Berlin blockade fortified their
convictions. Dubois perfectly described the judges when he
wrote, "No playright could have conceived a more inspiring
tragedy than the Farben judges. . . ." John Appleman
wrote that the difference in the verdicts of the secondary
war crimes trials arose from differences in the judges*
3philosophy rather than from the amount of evidence.
The Farben tribunal also found it difficult to 
condemn individuals for the collective decisions of this 
large bureaucratic empire. Collectively, however, the 
Farben leaders were active participants in the Holocaust. 
Dubois described them best when he wrote that they were 
"industrialists who deliberately washed their hands in 
blood.
2Josiah Dubois, The Devil's Chemists (Boston: The
Beacon Press, 1952), p. 357.
3'John Alan Appleman, Military Tribunals and 
International Crimes (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1971),
p. 183.
^Dubois, Devil*s Chemists, p. 360.
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A P P E N D IX  A
POSITIONS OF THE DEFENDANTS
Carl Krauch:
Hermann Schmitz:
The Plenipotentiary General for 
Special Questions of Chemical Pro­
duction; he represented the chemical 
industry at the highest planning 
level of government. In 1940, he 
succeeded the deceased Carl Bosch 
as chairman of I.G. Farben's 
supervisory board (Auf sichtsrat) .
The chairman of the Vorstand since 







Chief of the Sales Committee which 
planned and directed Farben's 
foreign and domestic sales.
Chief of the Technical Committee and 
Sparte II which made buna rubber, 
pharmaceuticals, and poison gases; 
he succeeded Krauch as head of the 
Vermittlungstelle Wehrmacht in 1936 
(Farben's army liaison office in 
Berlin).
Director of the buna plant at I.G. 
Auschwitz; production chief for 
buna rubber and poison gases.
Director of the synthetic oil plant 
at I.G. Auschwitz; production chief 
for gasoline and methanol (the 
material used to burn the gassed 
victims' bodies); member of Himmler's 
"Circle of Friends"; participated in 
the first meeting with Hitler.
Chief of the Bayer sales combine 
and chairman of the board of direc­
tors of Degesch.
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Secretary of the Vorstand and a 
director of Degesch (discharged 
before the trial began on grounds 
of poor health).
Chief of Farben's chemical planning 
who was a Nobel Prizewinner in the 
field of medicine; a director of 
Degesch.
Technical director of inorganic 
factories and a director of Degesch.
Chief of Sparte I which made nitro­
gen, gasoline, lubricating oils, and 
methanol; member of the SS.
Chief of Sparte III which made photo­
graphic materials, gunpowder, and 
explosives.
Chief of the Vermittlungstelle 
Wehrmacht office and head of the 
central service department which 
dealt with protocal, legal problems, 
press, and political economy.
Chief negotiator of the Sales Com­
mittee .
Production chief for light metals, 
dyestuffs, plastics, and nitrogen; 
director of light-metals concerns 
throughout Europe.
Director in charge of construction 
and physical plant development.
Director in charge of the European 
nitrogen syndicate.
Chairman of Farben's legal and 
patent committes.
Director who was an expert in 
explosives.
Chief of the Farben works in Hoechst 
and director of the Typhus Institute 
in Lemberg.
Managing director of I.G. Auschwitz.




Erich von der Heyde:
Chief of the political-economv 
department at the Vermittlungstelle 
Wehrmacht; organized Farben’s first 
meeting with Hitler.
Member of Farben's Sales Committee 
who organized the newly acquired 
plants throughout Europe.
Member of the political-economy 
department and member of the SS.
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A P P E N D IX  B
A COMPLETE LIST OF THE SENTENCES IMPOSED 
AND THE TIME LEFT TO SERVE
Carl Krauch, guilty of Count III, slavery and mass murder; 
sentenced to imprisonment for six years; reduced to four 
years and one month because of time spent in custody.
Otto Ambros, guilty of Count III, slavery and mass murder; 
sentenced to imprisonment for eight years; reduced to six 
years and one month.
Heinrich Buetefisch, guilty of Count III, slavery and mass 
murder; sentenced to imprisonment for six years; reduced 
to two years and eight months.
Walter Duerrfeld, guilty of Count III, slavery and mass 
murder; sentenced to imprisonment for eight years; reduced 
to five years and three months.
Fritz ter Meer, guilty of Count II, plunder and spoliation, 
and Count III, slavery and mass murder; sentenced to 
imprisonment for seven years; reduced to three years and 
eight months.
Hermann Schmitz, guilty of Count II, plunder and spoliation 
sentenced to imprisonment for four years; reduced to eight 
months.
Georg von Schnitzler, guilty of Count II, plunder and 
spoilation; sentenced to imprisonment for five years; 
reduced to one year and nine months.
Max Ilgner, guilty of Count II, plunder and spoilation; 
sentenced to imprisonment for three years; released.
Friedrich Jaehne, guilty of Count II, plunder and spoila­
tion; sentenced to imprisonment for one and one-half years; 
reduced to two and one-half months.
Paul Haefliger, guilty of Count II, plunder and spoilation; 
sentenced to imprisonment for two years; reduced to six 
and one-half months.
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Hans Kugler, guilty of Count II, plunder and spoilation; 
sentenced to imprisonment for one and one-half years; 
released.
Heinrich Oster, guilty of Count II, plunder and spoilation; 
sentenced to imprisonment for two years; reduced to six 
months.
Ernst Buergin, guilty of Count II, plunder and spoilation; 
sentenced to imprisonment for two years; reduced to six 
months.
The tribunal acquitted August von Knieriem, Heinrich 
Hoerlein, Christian Schneider, Fritz Gajewski, Hans Kuehne, 
Carl Lautenschlaeger, Carl Wurster, Wilhelm Mann, Erich von 
der Heyde, and Heinrich Gattineau.
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